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UNBRIDLED ENFORCEMENT AND
FLAWED CULPABILITY STANDARDS
DETER SMES FROM ENTERING THE
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
Stephen S. Laudone*
In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, which exposed a variety of
corporate as well as political abuses, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) discovered that a staggering number of large
corporations had made questionable or illegal payments exceeding $300
million to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties. In
1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to curb
the negative impact of these corrupt payments on United States foreign
policy objectives regarding the promotion of democracy and the free
market system.
In the decades since the passage of the FCPA, the government has
expanded the use of the statute beyond its original target (large
corporations) to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often
lack the resources and international business sophistication to guard
against bribery and extortion in all its forms and thus avoid liability.
Additionally, the government’s enforcement regime exists largely outside
the courts. As a result, the investigative tactics and settlement agreements
are overly harsh on SMEs, exceed statutorily proscribed penalties, and
discourage utilization and litigation of a variety of statutory provisions
designed to protect businesses from liability.
This Comment argues that the FCPA should be amended to provide
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editors of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for all of their efforts in revising
this piece.
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SMEs proper defenses against liability through the mental state provisions
for domestic concerns and require more judicial oversight of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC enforcement policies. These
changes will encourage SMEs to enter the international marketplace and
protect SMEs from investigative costs and settlement penalties that do
serious harm to their financial situation and are often disproportionate to
the alleged wrongdoing.
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INTRODUCTION
The management of a hypothetical Alabama-based agriculture
irrigation utility company (AIC) receives a request from a regional
government entity in an African country (Country Z) looking to increase
farming production through enhanced irrigation systems to address its food
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shortage and import-export imbalance.1 AIC has never engaged in an
international project but sees this as an incredible opportunity to grow its
business, currently consisting of 140 employees and grossing $15 million a
year in revenue.2 AIC representatives work with a regional official from
Country Z over the terms of the contract which include a provision for an
initial down payment of 35% of the estimated project costs and the
remaining 65% at the conclusion of the work. AIC agrees to employ local
workers to the extent possible and will send American employees to
evaluate the region’s needs, manage the project, and provide the requisite
expertise throughout. Towards the end of negotiations, the official
introduces the AIC representatives to a local consultant who is “familiar
with the agricultural production and irrigation needs of the region” and will
“represent the government throughout the process and assist in dealing with
local entities.” AIC representatives agree to these terms and begin work on
the project to assist with upland storage of rainfall runoff, develop well and
surface/groundwater processes, and promote effective water management,
all of which was to be completed in eight months.3
Six months into the project, Country Z’s immigration officials inform
AIC that several of their American employees in the country lack the
requisite documentation and are facing fines, jail, or deportation unless AIC
pays cash fines to rectify the situation. Too far into the project to back out
and concerned for their safety, AIC encourages the targeted employees to
1

This hypothetical is designed to present the reader with a simple picture of some of the
difficult issues that confront small- and medium-sized enterprises conducting business
overseas for the first time.
2
Small- and medium-sized enterprises employ between 100 and 5,000 employees and
revenue varies by industry. See Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, U.S. SMALL
BUS. ASS’N, (current as of Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.sba.gov/content/summary-sizestandards-industry-sector (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (providing data regarding what
constitutes a small business); Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Overview of
Participation in U.S. Exports, Inv. No. 332-508 (USITC PUB. 4125, January 2010), U.S.
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4125.pdf (“[N]o universally
accepted definition of an SME [exists], even within the U.S. government” because “the
relative nature of the ‘small’ and ‘medium’ size classifications . . . can apply differently to
firms in the manufacturing, agricultural, and service sectors.”). Part III.B.2 of this article
contains a more thorough discussion of what constitutes an SME. The FCPA itself does not
contain a definition for SME.
3
The inspiration for this hypothetical was partially drawn from the following sources:
Irrigation, Alabama Agricultural Irrigation Information Network, ALA. COOP. EXTENSION
SYS., http://www.aces.edu/anr/irrigation/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) and Sandra Postel,
Small-scale Irrigation Boosts Incomes and Food Security in sub-Saharan Africa, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 8, 2013), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2013/08/08/small-scaleirrigation-boosts-incomes-and-food-security-in-sub-saharan-africa/.
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pay the fines and reimburses them through their next paycheck.4 At the
conclusion of the eight-month project period, AIC requests payment from
Country Z officials for the remaining balance under the contract. Months
go by and finally AIC gets a response from a Country Z official requiring
AIC to pay a “service fee” to a government official in order to obtain the
remaining balance on the contract and close the account. Based on its
financial position and the need for these proceeds for continued investment
in future projects, AIC representatives agree to pay the fees to facilitate
final payment for services rendered.5
After completion of the project, the U.S. government opens an
investigation as either the result of a tip or regularly scheduled audit of
companies doing business in regions of the world considered particularly
prone to corruption. During this investigation, the government requests
information regarding the work done by the local consultant and an
itemization justifying the fees said consultant charged. When AIC is unable
to sufficiently assuage the U.S. government’s concerns based on Country
Z’s propensity for corruption, further investigation reveals the local
consultant was the relative of a government official and sent a portion of the
fees to said official as a kickback. Suddenly, AIC faces civil penalties for
violating the accounting provisions of the FCPA and criminal charges for
the alleged briberies made to the foreign government in the form of
consultant fees and the “service fees.” The company is at risk of fines and
disgorgement potentially in the millions, and any directors, officers,

4

This situation is based on the facts of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(hereinafter “SEC”) investigation of Test Automation & Controls, Inc. See Joseph W.
Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 796–97 (2011)
(citing Client Memorandum from Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP on SEC Brings FCPA
Charges Based on Extorted Payments (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.willkie.com (search
“NATCO FCPA”)).
5
This portion of the hypothetical is based on the facts of the Department of Justice’s
(hereinafter “DOJ”) investigation of Vitusa Corporation and related individual defendants.
See Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When Is A Bribe Not A Bribe? A Re-Examination of the
FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 133 (2013) (referring
to United States v. Vitusa Corporation, Case No. 94-CR-253, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.155 (D. N.J.
1994) and Exhibit B: Stipulated Facts and Application of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (May 23, 1994), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/case/united-states-v-vitusa-corporation-court-docket-number-94-cr-253).
Situations
like this one enter the gray area of what constitutes a facilitating payment (to cause a foreign
official to do a lawful action in the event of a delay or a need for expedited action) which is
legal under the FCPA versus a bribe. To many SMEs, this fee might seem unjust, but
without experienced counsel and a compliance program, company leadership may not realize
it could be perceived as a bribe to a foreign official.
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employees, or agents found to be culpable face prison time as well.6
This hypothetical situation encompasses several common pitfalls that
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face as they enter the global
marketplace.7 Companies that are unable to hire sophisticated legal
representation for the purpose of developing a thorough compliance
program due to insufficient financial means, or a lack of knowledge of the
extraordinary risks associated with international business, are left at the
mercy of a vigorous and strict governmental enforcement regime. When
carrying out the FCPA enforcement regime, the government often ignores,
or chooses not to view as mitigating, the fact that companies regularly face
extortion from foreign governments, companies, and individuals.8 The
government also often ignores the size and sophistication of the company
when investigating and making prosecutorial determinations even when it is
clear the entity and its leadership lacked intent to violate the FCPA and
engage in bribery or foreign corruption.9
After almost forty years and several congressional amendments, the
existing case law on the FCPA, coupled with a sharp increase in DOJ and
SEC enforcement measures, have resulted in two trends, both of which
operate to the detriment of SMEs. The first trend is a narrowing of vital
statutorily-created exceptions and affirmative defenses to FCPA liability,
and the second trend is a broadening of the mental states required for
conviction under the statute. Looking forward, Congress should amend the
statute to require a mental state equivalent to specific intent, and account for
differences between sophisticated, multi-national corporations and SMEs.
The “willfulness” requirement should also apply to SMEs as it does to
6
See infra Part III.B.1, notes 146–147 for a brief discussion of individual penalties both
monetary and imprisonment.
7
For the definition of SMEs, see infra Part III.B.2.
8
Yockey, supra note 4, at 797 (noting that in the TEST case, the SEC charged the
company with FCPA accounting violations even after acknowledging that the company
“falsely recorded the employees’ reimbursement for the ransom payments as a salary
advance” because they were the victims of extortion).
9
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 8 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE] (admitting that
there are areas where “the United States’ anti-bribery efforts could be improved, including
consolidating publicly available information on the application of the FCPA and enhancing
awareness among small- and medium-sized companies about the prevention and detection of
foreign bribery”). The government also formally acknowledges that “[i]n addition to the
existence and scope of a company’s training program, a company should develop
appropriate measures, depending on the size and sophistication of the particular company, to
provide guidance and advice on complying with the company’s ethics and compliance
program, including when such advice is needed urgently.” Id. at 59.
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individuals.10 Additionally, Congress should act to reinvigorate the
“greasing the wheels” (hereinafter “facilitating payments”) and “local law
or customs” exceptions while also establishing mandatory Article III
jurisdiction over proposed settlements by requiring the filing of civil and
criminal complaints.
Part I of this Comment provides a history of the FCPA and a
discussion of the functional effect of the statute and a prima facie case
under the anti-bribery provisions. Part II outlines some of the problems that
have developed around what little FCPA case law exists and provides
examples of how many small- and medium-sized enterprises find
themselves in situations of potential liability under the current system
without a clear understanding of the government’s burden regarding mental
states and the statutory exceptions that should be available to them. Part III
describes these problems in more detail by discussing the enforcement
regime that the DOJ and SEC have developed outside of the court system
and the problems with insufficient litigation surrounding the FCPA.
Finally, Part IV discusses both existing proposed solutions to some of the
problems outlined in Parts II and III as well as some new solutions
specifically designed to aid small- and medium-sized enterprises as they
navigate the global marketplace while also trying to avoid crippling liability
under the FCPA.
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. HISTORY: THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Bribery has been a crime for millennia and punishable under the
common law for centuries. The first British statute criminalizing bribery
was passed in the 1300s and the first references to bribery cases in Britain
appear in the Star Chamber records around 1550.11 The United States
expanded the term “bribery” well beyond its common law meaning to
include all government officials, as well as commercial bribery of

10

In both the domestic concern and individual anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, the
“willfully” requirement only applies to natural persons acting on behalf of themselves or a
company, not to the company itself. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2) (2012) (subjecting “[a]ny
natural person . . . acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates” the
statute to criminal and civil fines); Id. at § 78dd-3(e)(2) (subjecting “[a]ny natural person
who willfully violates” the statute to criminal and civil fines).
11
See James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1696 n.6, 1705 (1992–1993) (citing JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., BRIBES (1984) (“providing a history of bribery-type offenses from 3000 B.C. to 1984”)).
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individuals acting in a private capacity.12 The United States continued this
expansion by becoming the first nation to criminalize international bribery
through the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977.13
In the wake of the Watergate Scandal, which exposed a variety of
corporate (foreign bribery) as well as political abuses (slush funds for
domestic politicians), the SEC conducted its own investigation, which
culminated in an extensive “Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate
Payments and Practices” (SEC report).14 The SEC report detailed the
widespread misuse of corporate funds and questionable or illegal corporate
payments which “represented a serious breach in the operation of the
Commission’s system of corporate disclosure and, correspondingly, in
public confidence in the integrity of the system of capital formation.”15
Specifically, over 400 corporations had admitted making questionable or
illegal payments exceeding “$300 million in corporate funds to foreign
government officials, politicians, and political parties.”16 According to the
12

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1979).
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)), amended by 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1988) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1998).
14
H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2–4, nn.5–6 (1998) (discussing how the SEC acted after
“disclosures by the Watergate Special Prosecutor of overseas ‘slush’ used by U.S.
corporations to make illegal campaign contributions in the U.S. and corrupt payments to
foreign officials”); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114 at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 (referring to SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate
Practices). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was later passed to combat the first of these
abuses, bribery of foreign officials to gain business advantages. See also Disclosure of
Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1848, 1849 n.11 (1976) (defining slush funds as “sums of money not reflected in the
corporate accounts” which in some cases were found to have been “used for secret payments
to foreign government officials”).
15
See S. REP. NO. 95-114, supra note 14, at 3–4 (referring to SEC Report on
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Practices); see also Mike Koehler, The Story of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 932–49 (2012) (detailing the
investigations of the Church Committee and SEC report and the major examples of corrupt
payments made to heads of state and U.S. politicians leading up to the passage of the FCPA).
16
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/houseprt-95-640.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (stating
that over 117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries).
While the House Report does not explicitly define what questionable or improper
payments are, the phrase seems to be used to describe foreign bribes which are not expressly
illegal compared to “domestic bribes [which] are clearly illegal” under U.S. law. Id. at 6.
This understanding is supported by the fact that the proposed law sought to reach “foreign
subsidiaries of any U.S. corporation” because of the extensive use of these foreign
subsidiaries “as a conduit for questionable or improper foreign payments authorized by their
13
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House Report created by Congressman Harley O. Staggers Sr., Chairman of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, companies were
engaging in everything from bribing high-ranking foreign officials for
favorable action on behalf of the company, to making facilitating payments
to encourage government agents to discharge certain ministerial or clerical
functions.17 The volume of these domestic and foreign corrupt payments
posed a danger to the integrity of the United States’ elections and foreign
policy goals, including the goals of promoting democracy and a free market
system where companies should be able to honestly and ethically compete
in areas like price and quality of product.18 Thus, the FCPA contained antibribery provisions, as well as accounting requirements to prevent
companies from hiding bribes in financial records.19 The law provides for
joint enforcement responsibilities, shared between the DOJ and the SEC for
the criminal and civil applications.20
Since its passage, the FCPA has been amended twice. The 1988
Amendments21 were designed to address corporations’ concerns regarding
unclear and excessive accounting standards and the costs of competing in
domestic parent.” Id. at 12.
Similarly, the SEC does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes questionable
foreign payments, but notes in their report that virtually all questionable payments involved
“the deliberate falsification of corporate books or records, or the maintenance of inaccurate
or inadequate books and records which, among other things, prevented these practices from
coming to the attention of the company’s auditors, outside directors and shareholders.”
Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N 13 (May 1976), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegalcorporate-payments-practices-1976.pdf.
17
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 4.
18
Id. at 4–5 (listing the negative ramifications flowing from this level of bribery). The
report notes:
For example, in 1976, the Lockheed scandal shook the Government of Japan to its political
foundation and gave opponents of close ties between the United States and Japan an effective
weapon with which to drive a wedge between the two nations. In another instance, Prince
Bernhardt of the Netherlands was forced to resign from his official position as a result of an
inquiry into allegations that he received $1 million in pay-offs from Lockheed.

Id. at 5.
19
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012) (anti-bribery provisions). See generally Mary Jane
Dundas & Barbara Crutchfield George, Historical Analysis of the Accounting Standards of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 499 (1980) (conducting an indepth historical analysis of the FCPA accounting standards).
20
Brown, supra note 14, at 16 (1998) (discussing the shared, yet distinct enforcement
authority of the DOJ and SEC under the FCPA) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994) for SEC’s
authority and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d) for DOJ’s authority).
21
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, 1415 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff).
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foreign markets.22 In the decade following the 1988 Amendments,
enforcement efforts focused on policing international agreements with little
extraterritorial enforcement.23 Then, in 1998, a new set of Amendments24
was prompted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation &
Development Convention on combating the bribery of foreign officials.25
At the time, Congress agreed with the business community that the FCPA
was negatively impacting U.S. business success abroad because there were
no restraints on foreign firms that would pay bribes without fear of penalty,
to the detriment of U.S. businesses.26 The 1998 Amendments expanded the
jurisdiction of the FCPA to foreign persons who commit an act furthering a
foreign bribe while on U.S. soil, as well as U.S. businesses and nationals
acting wholly outside the United States.27 The Amendments also expanded
the FCPA’s scope to include payments made to secure “any improper
advantage” and broadened the definition of “public official” to include
officials of public international organizations.28 The FCPA has remained
unaltered since the 1998 Amendments, though the DOJ and SEC
enforcement models have changed.29 The following subsection addresses
the core anti-bribery provisions applicable to companies and individuals.
22

H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 6 (1981), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/tradeact-100-418.pdf; Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practice
Act on U.S. Business: Comptroller’s General Report to the Congress of the United States,
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 6 (1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf.
23
Emily Willborn, Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion in the
FCPA: A Call for International Prosecutorial Factors, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 422, 426 (2013).
24
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1998)).
25
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions and Related Documents, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 21,
1997), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [hereinafter
OECD Convention].
26
See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1–2 (1998) (explaining that bribery is estimated to affect
overseas procurements valued in the billions of dollars each year and how the amendment
reconciles the FCPA with the OECD Convention in order to “level the playing field”)
[hereinafter BANKING COMMITTEE SENATE REPORT 1998].
27
Id. at 4 (“The new offense . . . provid[es] for criminal jurisdiction in this country over
bribery by foreign nationals of foreign officials when the foreign national takes some act in
furtherance of the bribery within the territory of the United States.”).
28
See id. at 2.
29
Matthew J. Kovacich, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of
Increased Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and
Wisconsin, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 544–49 (2009) (discussing how the DOJ and SEC are
“engaging in new, creative techniques to sanction individual company agents, disgorge
companies of their profits, and settle investigations through deferred prosecution
agreements” compared to the FCPA’s first thirty years of existence).
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B. THE PROHIBITIONS AND ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE

In order to establish a prima facie criminal case against an entity or
individual under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the government must
establish the existence of six elements. The defendant must be:
1. a domestic concern [or individual or issuer]
2. that made use of a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
3. corruptly
4. in furtherance of an offer or payment of anything of value to any person
5. while knowing that the money would be offered or given directly or indirectly to
any foreign official
6. for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
30
capacity.

The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions encompass three mental states that
address acts done “corruptly,” acts done while “knowing” bribery will
result, and acts done “willfully” by individuals to violate the statute.31
Additionally, Congress has carved out several exceptions to the anti-bribery
provisions including the “facilitating payments” exception, which states that
prohibitions do not apply to any “facilitating or expediting payment to a
foreign official, political party, or party official, the purpose of which is to
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a
foreign official, political party, or party official.”32 The Senate Report of
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, favorably
reporting bill S. 305 and recommending it for passage, noted that the
facilitating payments exception would cover “payments for expediting
shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call,
securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police protection,
transactions which may involve even the proper performance of duties.”33
The statute’s anti-bribery provisions provide for two affirmative
defenses as well. The first is the “legality defense,” which permits a
payment, gift, offer, or promise that is lawful under the laws or regulations
30

Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal
Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Stichting]; see also Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
749, 757–58 (2011) (setting forth the seven elements of an FCPA violation) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3).
31
See infra Part II.A for a fuller discussion of the meaning of these mental state terms
and how courts have interpreted them.
32
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2012) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(b) (for domestic concerns); §
78dd-3(b) (for “any person”).
33
S. REP. No. 95-114 at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108
[hereinafter BANKING COMMITTEE SENATE REPORT 1977].
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of the foreign official’s country.34 While many nations permit behavior that
would fall under the legality defense, companies can rarely take advantage
of this defense because the written laws of foreign nations rarely allow for
such conduct because it is implicit in the business and political culture.35
The second is the “reasonable expenditure defense,” which permits a
payment, gift, offer, or promise if it was a “reasonable and bona fide
expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses” that the company
incurred on behalf of a foreign official and was directly related to the
“promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services” or “the
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or
agency thereof.”36
When requested, the DOJ provides guidance to companies through
opinion procedure releases on what is considered reasonable and bona fide
expenditures. The trend throughout these opinion releases is that the
expenditures tend to be modest, related to travel and hotel reimbursement,
and paid to the providers, not to the officials themselves.37 For example,
one anonymous requestor received an opinion procedure release sanctioning
the payment of domestic expenses for “approximately six junior to midlevel officials of a foreign government for an educational program at the
[r]equestor’s U.S. headquarters” after these officials attend “an annual sixweek long internship program for foreign insurance regulators sponsored by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.”38 The expenses to
be paid were limited to “domestic economy class air travel . . . domestic
lodging, local transport, meals and incidental expenses (up to a modest set
amount per day upon presentation of a receipt), and a modest four-hour city
sightseeing tour for the six officials.”39 While these exceptions and
34

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2012) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(c)(1) (for domestic concerns);
§ 78dd-3(c)(1) (for “any person”).
35
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 536 & n.38 (referencing DOJ, Lay-Person’s Guide to
FCPA, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa-guidance (last visited Nov. 13, 2015)
[hereinafter Lay-Person’s Guide to FCPA]); RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at 23 (“[T]he
fact that bribes may not be prosecuted under local law is insufficient to establish the defense.
In practice, the local law defense arises infrequently, as the written laws and regulations of
countries rarely, if ever, permit corrupt payments.”).
36
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (2012) (for issuers); § 78dd-2(c)(2) (for domestic concerns);
§ 78dd-3(c)(2) (for “any person”).
37
F. JOSEPH WARIN ET AL., THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE 18 (Bloomberg BNA, 2014).
38
FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 07-02 (Dep’t of Justice Sept. 11, 2007).
39
Id.; see also FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 04-04 (Dep’t of Justice Sept. 3,
2004) (sanctioning a “Study Tour” for foreign officials to help “develop a practical
understanding of how mutual insurance committees are managed and regulated” and
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defenses to FCPA liability and enforcement are statutorily prescribed, their
applicability has been severely narrowed by the DOJ and SEC. The
following section discusses problems surrounding the various mental states
required by the FCPA.
II. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE FCPA STATUTE AND CURRENT
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO THE MENTAL STATE
REQUIREMENT
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions contain several layers of mental
state requirements including acts done “corruptly,” acts done while
“knowing” bribery will result, and acts done “willfully” by individuals to
violate the statute, but these terms and how they interact are not clearly
defined in the context of the statute. This has led to some confusion in the
circuit courts,40 a problem that is exacerbated by the lack of cases being
tried under the FCPA.41 Some guidance does come from the FCPA’s
legislative history.
The FCPA prohibits domestic concerns and any individuals on their
behalf from acting “corruptly” in furtherance of a payment, gift, or offer of
anything of value to influence or induce a foreign official, political
campaign, or candidate for office to violate the law, act in his official
capacity, or aid in securing an improper advantage for the company.42 The
differences (if any) in the organization, daily operation, capitalization, regulations,
demutualization, and management of mutual insurance companies versus stock insurance
companies (life and non-life)”); FCPA Opinion Procedure Release No. 07-01 (Dep’t of
Justice July 24, 2007) (sanctioning payment of domestic expenses for a “six-person
delegation of the government of an Asian country for an educational and promotional tour of
one of the requestor’s U.S. operations sites”).
40
See generally Gregory M. Lipper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Elusive
Question of Intent, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1463, 1470 (2010) (providing an overview of the
circuit court’s discussion of the FCPA mental state requirements and efforts by Congress to
provide clarity).
41
The lack of FCPA case law is driven by the high stakes companies face when
confronted with a DOJ or SEC investigation. Companies are reluctant to risk the resources
necessary to successfully litigate against the government and pay the penalties if found
guilty. See infra Part III.A for a fuller discussion of the government’s enforcement regime
and its impact on companies’ business and FCPA litigation.
42
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
The term “domestic concern” means—(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident
of the United States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place
of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United
States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.

Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
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statute also prohibits acts done “corruptly” in furtherance of a payment, gift,
or offer of anything of value to a person, “while knowing that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value” will be used to influence a foreign
official.43 The statute does provide a definition section which explains that
a person’s state of mind constitutes “knowing” when: “(i) such person is
aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance
exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person
has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is
substantially certain to occur.”44 Knowledge can be established if the
individual is aware of a “high probability of the existence of such
circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance
does not exist.”45 According to the 1977 Senate Report’s definition:
[t]he word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise,
or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order
to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential
legislation or a favorable regulation. The word “corruptly” connotes an evil motive or
46
purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.

The House Report defines the term similarly, stating:
[t]he word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise,
or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position; for
example, wrongfully to direct business to the payor or his client, to obtain preferential
legislation or regulations, or to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official
47
function.

The term “corruptly” is not defined anywhere in the statute. In the handful
of FCPA cases that have reached the circuit courts, the legislative history
has been influential in understanding the word “corruptly.”48
When dealing with a person charged as an individual or an officer,
director, agent, or some other type of company employee, the individual
43

Id. § 78dd-2(a)(3) (2012).
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2012).
45
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B) (2012).
46
S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108.
47
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 7–8 (1977) (comparing the term “corruptly” to its use to
“connote[] an evil motive or purpose,” as in 18 U.S.C. § 201 which criminalizes the bribing
of a domestic official).
48
See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 2007) (The court discusses
how “the [legislative] history serves as additional support for the court’s resolution of the
ambiguity of the business nexus test. This Court looked to numerous aspects of the Act—its
text, its title, its ‘grease payments’ exception, the dictionary definition of ‘business,’ and the
Act’s legislative history.”); Stichting, 327 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
44
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must “willfully” violate the FCPA by corruptly influencing a foreign
official (directly or through an intermediary), in order to be subject to
criminal fines or incarceration.49 The Supreme Court has stated that
“willfulness” generally requires at least “proof that the defendant knew that
his conduct was unlawful. . . .”50
These three mental states present challenges to SMEs who lack the
sophisticated legal counsel and compliance programs of larger entities,
especially when SMEs are new to the global marketplace and unfamiliar
with the risks, customs, and laws of the foreign countries in which they
operate. Challenges faced by SMEs, like obtaining the knowledge required
to understand the FCPA’s mental state requirements, are exacerbated by the
low volume of case law and the confusing nature of relevant circuit court
opinions.51
A. THE COURTS INTERPRET THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS

Few courts have examined the FCPA, which is in part due to the lack
of litigation reaching the trial stage.52 This is a result of the enforcement
tactics of the DOJ and SEC.53 In United States v. Liebo,54 the Eighth
Circuit first considered the meaning of “corruptly” using interstate
commerce to make a payment, promise, or gift to a foreign official for the
purpose of influencing their actions. In Liebo, the first consular for the
Niger Embassy in Washington, D.C. considered airline tickets to be
personal gifts from defendant Liebo.55 The court was satisfied that
sufficient evidence existed to allow a reasonable jury to find that the airline
tickets were given “corruptly” as a “commission payment” or to induce the
consular to misuse his official position.56 The Eighth Circuit also affirmed
the district court’s jury instructions, which defined “corruptly” as requiring
that “the offer, promise to pay, payment or authorization of payment, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position or to
49

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(e)(2)(A) (2012). Civil
penalties are also available under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(B) (2012) and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd3(e)(2)(B) (2012).
50
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1470 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 186
(1998)).
51
See infra Part II.B.
52
See generally Lipper, supra note 40.
53
See Part III.A for a fuller discussion of the government’s enforcement regime and its
impact on companies’ business and FCPA litigation.
54
923 F.2d 1308, 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
55
Id. at 1312.
56
Id.

6. LAUDONE

2016]

3/1/2017 5:55 PM

FCPA: UNBRIDLED ENFORCEMENT

369

influence someone else to do so,” and that “an act is ‘corruptly’ done if
done voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad purpose of
accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by
some unlawful method or means.”57
This jury instruction contains dueling definitions of the term corruptly.
The first portion reflects the FCPA’s legislative history that a payment must
be made with “the specific intent to cause a misuse of an official’s position”
in order to be done “corruptly.”58 The second portion seems to expand this
definition by “suggesting that the ‘corruptly’ element is met when the
‘private payment to the official [is] intended to simply get the fair treatment
to which the payer was otherwise legally entitled.’”59 Not only does this
second portion of the jury instruction seem to broaden the applicability of
the “corruptly” element, it potentially conflicts with both the “facilitating
payment” exception and the interpretation of legislative history that
“corporations are protected when foreign officials use economic extortion
to receive payments.”60 The Eighth Circuit has not clarified the definition
of the term “corruptly” since Liebo.
Over a decade passed before another circuit court addressed the mental
states of the FCPA. In 2003, the Second Circuit held in Stichting Ter
Behartiging Van de Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van
Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber (“Stichting”)61 that a defendant is not
required to have knowledge that it is violating the FCPA in order to be
convicted because the FCPA is a general intent statute and knowledge of
the specific statute applies “mainly [to] tax and other technical statutes that
use the term ‘willfully.’”62 The court was not clear that its analysis was
only applicable to companies because the term “willfully” does appear in
the statute as applied to individuals.63 The court also looked to the guidance

57

Id.
Preston Tull Eldridge, Without Bounds: Navigating Corporate Compliance Through
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 66 ARK. L. REV. 733, 761 (2013).
59
Id. (quoting Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 328 (2012)).
60
Id. at 761–62.
61
327 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003). Later that same year, the Eighth Circuit affirmed jury
instructions that construed the FCPA knowledge requirement to include “deliberate
ignorance,” so long as the defendant(s) deny any knowledge of a criminal scheme despite
being presented with facts that put the defendant(s) on notice of possible criminal activity
that the defendant(s) then failed to investigate. United States v. King, 351 F.3d 859, 866–67
(8th Cir. 2003).
62
Id. at 181 n.3, 182–83.
63
Id. at 181–83.
58
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of Senate and House Reports for an understanding that “corruptly” should
be viewed as it is under the bribery statute, meaning, a “bad or wrongful
purpose and an intent to influence a foreign official to misuse his official
position.”64 The Second Circuit viewed the Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of
the jury instructions in Liebo as an approval of the trial court’s reasoning
that the defendant violated the FCPA only if he sought to induce a foreign
official to act “unlawfully” by misusing his position.65
The following year, the individual defendants in United States v. Kay
(Kay III)66 argued on appeal that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that they “corruptly” and “willfully” violated subsections of the FCPA in
order to obtain a criminal conviction.67 Because the statute does not define
“willfully,” the court discussed the three common law definitions of
criminal “willfulness”: (1) the basic definition (committing an act and
having knowledge of that act); (2) the intermediate definition (committing
an act with knowledge that the act is unlawful); and (3) the strict definition
(knowing the terms of the statute and violating them).68 The Fifth Circuit
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
individual defendants’ two proposed jury instructions because the first
proposed instructions were not substantively correct and the second
proposed instructions were substantially covered by the trial court’s jury
instructions which sufficiently captured both the basic and intermediate
definitions of willfulness.69 The court rejected the strict definition of
willfulness as inapplicable to the FCPA, adopting the Second Circuit’s
reasoning that the FCPA is a general intent statute.70 Finally, the Fifth
Circuit stated that the indictment was “not required to contain the exact
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 183.
Id. at 183 n.9.
513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 447–49. The Fifth Circuit held that:

[t]he district court, by instructing the jury that a guilty verdict required a finding that defendant
acted “voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of accomplishing
either an unlawful end or result,” and by including a separate “knowing” instruction, correctly
indicated that the jury must identify evidence amounting to “knowledge of facts that constitute
the offense” required by the traditional criminal definition of willfulness (which we have
described as the first category of willfulness). The court’s instructions also substantially covered
the requested instruction that Defendants acted “corruptly,” meaning they acted “knowingly and
dishonestly, with the specific intent to achieve an unlawful result by influencing a foreign public
official’s action in one’s own favor.”

Id.
70

Id. at 448.
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term ‘willfulness’” and that “an indictment alleging that [a] defendant
‘corruptly did endeavor’ sufficiently ‘charges an intentional act,’ which is
‘interchangeable with the term willful.’”71
Scholar Gregory Lipper argues that there are two issues with the
decision in Kay III. First, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s jury
instructions, which stated the statute’s use of “corruptly” meant “done
voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of
accomplishing either an unlawful end or result” and the statute’s use of
“knowingly” meant “done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of
accident or mistake.”72 The district court failed to provide a separate
instruction regarding the meaning of “willfully” and when the jury asked if
a “lack of knowledge of the FCPA could be considered an accident or
mistake,” the court simply “referred the jury to its definition of the term
knowingly.”73 Second, Lipper points out that the Fifth Circuit conflated
“willfully” and “corruptly” and held that the “‘[d]efendants’ knowledge that
they were committing the acts of corrupt bribery of foreign officials was
sufficient’ to convey the separate requirement of willfulness.’”74 The
danger in reading the statute to allow corruptly to “subsume[] the concept
of willfulness [is that it] effectively reads the ‘willfully’ element out of the
statute.”75 This removes a layer of protection for individuals, like the
defendants in Kay III, where a statute “extends to a range of conduct that an
ordinary person would not necessarily understand to be unlawful.”76 Lipper
believes the Fifth Circuit made this error because of the confusing
discussion of the willfulness requirement in Stichting as it applies to
companies.77
The Second Circuit revisited the mental state issue under the FCPA in
United States v. Kozeny.78 The defendant argued that the district court
71

Id. at 451 (quoting United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1475 (quoting Kay III, 513 F.3d at 446).
73
Id. (quoting Kay III, 513 F.3d at 446, 449 n.62).
74
Id. at 1476 (quoting Kay III, 513 F.3d at 449 n.62) (emphasis in original).
75
Brief for National Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-20604),
2006 WL 5582334 at *5.
76
Id. (comparing the FCPA to a variety of other statutes containing a willfulness
requirement for individuals including Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994)
which addresses a tax statute and declares that judges should resist treating statutory terms in
such a way as to render an element of an offense as surplusage). See Part IV.B for a
discussion of Ratzlaf and a solution to the court’s conflation of mental state requirements.
77
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1475.
78
667 F.3d 122, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2011).
72
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“erred by failing to instruct the jury that the government needed to prove
[that he] acted ‘corruptly’ and ‘willfully’ to sustain a conviction on FCPA
conspiracy.”79 The Second Circuit appeared to agree with the holding of
the Fifth Circuit, that to violate the FCPA one must act “corruptly” and
“willfully.”80 The court held that the district court properly instructed the
jury that it must find the defendant knowingly entered a conspiracy that had
the object of “corruptly” and “willfully” bribing foreign officials and that
the defendant intended to aid in achieving this object.81 Once again,
willfulness was not held to require the government to show the defendant
was aware of a specific law that prohibited his conduct and instead held it
sufficient that the defendant “act[] deliberately and with the intent to do
something that the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose to disobey or
disregard the law.”82 Like the courts before it, the Second Circuit’s analysis
conflates the definitions of corruptly and willfully under the FCPA, thereby
rendering the willfulness requirement surplusage.83 If federal judges
struggle to understand and accurately interpret the FCPA’s mental state
requirements and how they work together, SMEs that are new to the global
marketplace (and the individuals running them) and acting without the
benefit of sophisticated legal counsel and compliance plans are unlikely to
be able to effectively guard against liability under the statute.
B. A TRAP FOR UNSUSPECTING SMALLER BUSINESSES

The extremely small number of cases interpreting the mental state
requirements under the FCPA combined with its declared general intent
status renders compliance for small- and medium-sized enterprises
extremely difficult.84 Small, unsophisticated companies just entering the
global marketplace for the first time are not able to seek refuge behind an
argument of ignorance or a true lack of “willfulness” to commit bribery and
there are very few cases upon which to rely on when evaluating culpability
and obligations under the statute. A company embarking on its first project
overseas or a company that only does work sporadically abroad will often
79

Id. at 130.
Id. at 136.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 135.
83
“[I]n November [2009] U.S. Judge Shira Scheindlin in Manhattan sentenced him to
only a year and a day, saying ‘after years of supervising this case, it’s still not entirely clear
to me whether Mr. Bourke is a victim or a crook.’” Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown
on Bribery Hurts Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.
com/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html.
84
See Part III.B.2 (defining an SME).
80
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lack the institutional knowledge developed through experience with the
various risks in the project’s home country (including but not limited to the
level of corruption that exists there). When international projects make up
only a small percentage of a business or constitute a new venture entirely, it
is not necessarily obvious that such ventures require investing millions of
dollars in developing compliance programs and hiring lawyers for a
problem that has not yet occurred. SMEs find themselves in a challenging
business and legal environment when one combines the lack of experience
with the price tag of trying to prophylactically prevent activity that falls
within the broad definition of bribery. The government used provisions
from a statute originally passed to target large sophisticated business
entities, such as oil companies, to prosecute SMEs, which are unprepared
and unable to defend themselves or institute effective anti-liability
compliance programs.85
The FCPA only provides individuals with the protection of a
“willfulness” requirement for conviction, not businesses.86 This poses
serious problems for small- and medium-sized businesses. Smaller
companies have fewer employees, which makes it more likely that highlevel executives are involved in the everyday, minute decision-making for
the company.87 In the event of a DOJ investigation and indictment, SMEs
cannot argue that the mental state of criminal “willfulness” was not present,
even though the corporate action is more directly attributable to the SME’s
officers and directors because of how closely held SMEs often are
compared to large multi-national corporations with expansive subsidiaries.88
Even if the “willfulness” requirement did apply to closely held businesses,
the circuit courts have not been clear about which standard of “willfulness”

85

Kovacich, supra note 2935, at 531, 533.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (2012).
87
Rashna Bhojwani, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private Enforcement
Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 73–74 (2012) (citing Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 614 & n.149
(2005) (“[M]any small organizations sentenced under the Guidelines are ineligible for
sentence mitigation, due to top-management knowledge of or participation in the
misconduct.”)).
88
There is also the problem of the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse and the
individuals running this company will be bound by such a maxim. But Lipper notes that
Congress can override this presumption in a statute. Lipper, supra note 40, at 1470–71
(noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted “willfully” provisions in criminal statutes,
over the last several decades, to “require, at minimum, that the defendant know that his
conduct is illegal and often that the defendant know about the specific legal provision which
he is alleged to have violated”).
86
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applies.89 This problem is compounded by confusion among courts
Even if the
regarding the differing mental state requirements.90
“willfulness” requirement applied to SMEs as well as individuals, there is
still confusion in the circuits as to how “willfulness” and “corruptly” differ
and how to apply them.91 SMEs cannot claim a lack of knowledge of the
statute and its provisions and prohibitions as a defense, because many
courts such as the Second Circuit have held that the FCPA is a general
intent statute.92 Compare this to tax statutes, which courts have repeatedly
held are specific intent statutes that allow unsophisticated parties to argue
that they did not fully understand the complex statute and thus were unable
to comply fully, despite a desire to do so.93 The confusion surrounding the
FCPA’s mental states and the poor application of those mental states to
more closely held businesses adds multiple layers of difficulty for SMEs
attempting to mount a mental state culpability defense against a DOJ
investigation or indictment.
In addition, it is not clear that companies are always aware that their
behavior satisfies the “corruptly” mental state requirement because foreign
officials, foreign government agents, and foreign business people have
become more adept at hiding how money is used and where it goes. An
example is through the use of so-called local experts and consultants. The
industries of developing nations are often state-owned or operated, and
investors in those countries often require the services of “local agents.”94
These local agents are often well-connected to the foreign government and
have a strong knowledge of local customs, and because they are difficult to
supervise, bribes often happen unbeknownst to the foreign government or
the American company engaging with the agent.95 While it might seem
logical for American businesses to avoid these types of agents, “[w]ell-

89

Kay III, 513 F.3d 432, 447–49 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the jury instructions
satisfied the basic definition of willfulness (committing an act and having knowledge of that
act) and the intermediate definition of willfulness (committing an act with knowledge that
the act is unlawful, without actually specifying which was correct under the statute)).
90
See supra Part II.A for examples.
91
See supra Part II.A, at notes 55–57.
92
See supra Part II.A, at note 46.
93
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991) (discussing how the
Court’s prior decisions had interpreted “willfully” in the federal criminal tax laws as an
exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse because “[t]he proliferation of
statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and
comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws”).
94
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1464–65.
95
Id.
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connected local agents are essential to investing in most foreign countries,
especially those with Byzantine bureaucracies.”96 But in some countries, the
use of local agents is required.97 The Senate recognized the legitimacy of
using agents “with personal relationships with government officials” in the
locality where a company wants to do business.98 To quote businessman
Gilbert Chagoury—who is “believed to have acted as a middleman” for
former corrupt Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha—“You have lobbyists; we
have agents.”99 This reality of doing business in foreign countries not only
makes bribes more common, but it also increases the likelihood that the
company and its agents did not act with the requisite mental states:
corruptly and knowingly.
SMEs are also less likely to employ legal counsel with the resources
and experience to effectively counsel on issues of FCPA liability risk.
Large law and accounting firms are typically well-versed on FCPA liability
and compliance because they represent large international clients that can
afford to invest in the research, development, and implementation of
compliance programs.100 SMEs are less likely to employ these expensive
firms.101 For example, as Kovacich notes in his article on SMEs, Wisconsin
and Minnesota businesses are more likely to employ local Midwestern law
firms that “do not publish and update FCPA literature to educate their
96

Id. at 1486 (citing J. Scott Ballenger et al., Reigning in the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: The Supreme Court Ignores a Perfect Opportunity, 46 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 2
(2010)).
97
Id. (citing Lisa Middlekauff, To Capitalize on a Burgeoning Market? Issues to
Consider Before Doing Business in the Middle East, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 159, 170
(2008)).
98
S. REP. NO. 100–85, at 52 (1987).
99
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1486 (quoting Robin Urevich, Chasing the Ghosts of a
Corrupt Regime, FRONTLINE, (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/
2010/01/nigeria-chasing-the-ghosts-of-a-corrupt-regime.html).
100
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 544 n. 101 (noting these large law and accounting firms
“have generated most of the advertisements and educational literature regarding the FCPA
because recent trends have put significant pressure on [these] firms’ clients”).
101
“The global market is no longer a playing field just for the large corporation
[and] . . . [t]he leveling of the playing field is not always prevalent when it comes to
adequate resources that ensure compliance. The stakes are therefore chancier for privately
held companies that enter into high-risk markets and expand their international sales than for
large businesses with resources.” Deitra Crawley, How Company Size Influences FCPA
Enforcement, TAYLOR ENGLISH (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.taylorenglish.com/newsroompublications-How-Company-Size-Influences-FCPA-Enforcement-InsideCounsel.html
(“Most startups begin with a single individual or a small team, and do not have the
infrastructure to address the complicated risks associated with international business.
Oftentimes, there is no in- house counsel or specialized staff to navigate the risks.”).
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clients.”102 Even if an SME wanted to engage a large, experienced law firm
to aid them in developing a compliance program or investigating potential
abuses, doing so can often come at too high a price. Companies often pay
much more in pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses than
they do in penalties or settlement amounts to the government.103 During a
recent presentation on first-quarter fiscal year 2017 earnings, Wal-Mart
disclosed $21 million in expenses for ongoing FCPA investigations and
inquiries and another $4 million in expenses for their global FCPA
compliance program.104 Large companies such as Wal-Mart can often
absorb these high costs, but not all SMEs have the same capacity.105
102

Kovacich, supra note 29, at 553.
Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391,
396–97 (2014) (“For instance, in the NATCO enforcement action the company agreed to pay
a $65,000 civil penalty to resolve an SEC enforcement action. The company’s preenforcement action professional fees and expenses were reported to be $ 11 million and
caused the company cash-flow problems.”); see also Beverley Earle, Because It’s the Bottom
Line: The Need for Corporate Compliance Programs for Small- and Medium-Size
Businesses, 25 BUS. F. J. SCH. BUS. & ECON. 3, 3–5 (2000) (discussing the costs associated
with developing a compliance program through the hiring of expensive lawyers and how
many SMEs do not understand the incredibly high costs of not having a compliance
program); Earle & Cava, supra note 5, at 140 (“The smaller companies do not have the
resources to mount serious compliance efforts and they do not necessarily even appreciate
the risk they are facing. This study demonstrates the concerns executives have in trying to
operate within this landscape and still comply with both domestic and foreign laws.
104
Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 27, 2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-194/print/ (calculating Wal-Mart’s 1Q FCPA and
compliance-related costs to be approximately $396,000 per working day); see also The AntiBribery Business, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com/node/
21650557 (discussing how Wal-Mart will pay $800 million by the end of fiscal year 2015 on
its internal probe into non-trivial allegations of bribery in Mexico and on related compliance
improvement and by the time the government concludes this investigation which began in
2012, Wal-Mart’s costs will likely be close to $2 billion).
Former DOJ criminal fraud section chief Steven Tyrrell “estimated that a multinational
company spends, on average, about $2 million to investigate its operations in one country
and that most investigations span several countries . . . . Smaller investigations for a
‘specific, discrete issue,’ can cost around $100,000 to $200,000, said Paul McNulty, a
partner at Baker & McKenzie LLP. But companies have to be prepared to assure the
government that a problem in one country doesn’t exist in others.” Joe Palazzolo, FCPA
Inc.: The Business of Bribery, Corruption Probes Become Profit Center for Big Law Firms,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044386260457
8028462294611352.
105
“While major law firms advocate expensive compliance programs to alleviate risk,
smaller, less sophisticated companies can rarely afford the full panoply of these protections.”
Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2014). “The international law firm
Jones Day lists ‘ten questions’ every director should ask herself about FCPA compliance;
103
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Because SMEs are less likely to have the resources to invest in compliance
programs, and are often unaware of just how important they are, they are
less likely to create a sufficient demand for local law firms to invest in the
development of literature and compliance programs to help avoid FCPA
liability. Compound this reality with the costs of pre-government
enforcement action and many SMEs become defenseless targets against an
unchecked and unchallenged government enforcement regime.
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S UNCHECKED AND UNCHALLENGED
HISTORY OF ENFORCEMENT
The negative correlation between the frequency of investigations of
companies by the DOJ and the frequency of actual prosecutions that go to
trial is not a coincidence. In fact, throughout the entire course of the
FCPA’s existence, only two companies of any size have litigated charges to
a final verdict.106 In both cases, the DOJ lost. Yet despite these setbacks,
the DOJ successfully “prosecutes” companies every year without ever
setting foot in a courtroom.
The first case the DOJ brought under the FCPA against a company
occurred when the United States criminally indicted Harris Corporation
(“Harris”) (a publicly traded company), John D. Iacobucci (Vice President
and General Manager of the Digital Telephone Systems (“DTS”) division),
and Ronald L. Schultz (Director of Human Relations and Facilities at DTS,
Director of Administration at DTS and responsible for Contracts
Administration) in 1991.107 The defendants were charged with engaging in
a bribery scheme in violation of the FCPA which targeted a local
Colombian company owned by a foreign party official, members of the
national legislature of Colombia, and other local government officials.108
answering the questions with an effective compliance program would not be cheap.” Id. at
1347 n.66 (citing Jones Day, Ten Questions Every Director Should Ask About FCPA
Compliance (2010), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/b8f035e6-084c-40ad-a62d1446eee89829/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/28a5983b-457b-429d-99b5-bb07be2239
27/Ten Questions.pdf.
106
See infra notes 107–117 for a discussion of these two cases.
107
United States v. Harris Corporation, et al. (N.D. Cal. 1991) at *2 (unpublished case)
(link to indictment found here: http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/one-win-one-loss and
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/united-states-v-harris-corporation-et-al-courtdocket-number-90-cr-456).
108
Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
one-win-one-loss (citing United States v. Harris Corporation, et al. (N.D. Cal. 1991) at *2–3
(unpublished case) (link to indictment found here: http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/one-winone-loss and https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/united-states-v-harris-corporationet-al-court-docket-number-90-cr-456)).
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The criminal trial began on March 4, 1991.109 After the prosecution
presented its case, Judge Charles Legge granted a directed verdict of
acquittal because “‘no reasonable’ jury could convict the company nor its
executives on any of the five bribery-related counts for which they were
indicted” due to insufficient evidence showing that the defendants intended
to enter into a criminal conspiracy.110
The second case occurred two decades later when the government filed
a first superseding indictment against Lindsey Manufacturing Company and
two individuals with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and substantive
violations of the FCPA.111 Lindsey is a small, privately-owned company
that manufactures equipment used by electrical utility companies.112 The
Lindsey defendants allegedly paid bribes to two high-level employees of an
electric utility company wholly-owned by the Mexican Government.113
Lindsey made payments to the employees through their company as
commissions for services when in reality, the money was used for bribe
payments.114 After the jury convicted the defendants on all counts,115 the
court conducted a hearing in response to multiple motions filed by
defendants alleging prosecutorial misconduct.116 The court ultimately threw
out the convictions of all defendants and dismissed the first superseding
indictment after finding the government had
allowed a key FBI agent to testify untruthfully before the grand jury, inserted material
falsehoods into affidavits submitted to magistrate judges in support of applications for
search warrants and seizure warrants, improperly reviewed e-mail communications
between one Defendant and her lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery
obligations, posed questions to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s rulings,
engaged in questionable behavior during closing argument and even made
117
misrepresentations to the Court.

While not completely clear, it seems unlikely that the government would
109
110

Id.
Jim Doyle, Judge Tosses Out Overseas Bribery Case, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1991,

at B6.
111

United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
Id.
113
Id. at 1183.
114
Id. at 1183.
115
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., California Company, Its Two Executives and
Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their Involvement
in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico (May 10, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-company-its-two-executives-and-intermediaryconvicted-federal-jury-los-angeles-all.
116
Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
117
Id.
112
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have secured a conviction without engaging in the above-mentioned
misconduct. While these two cases seem like milestones in the history of
the FCPA that would impact the government’s enforcement strategies, that
has not been the case. This directed verdict of acquittal and vacated
conviction tandem has not emboldened companies to challenge the
government in court on interpretations of key provisions of the FCPA, and
these setbacks have not deterred the DOJ and SEC from pursuing an
aggressive enforcement strategy against companies suspected of violating
the FCPA.118 So far, no company has wanted to challenge the government
in open court because the “bet the firm” stakes are so high given the DOJ
and SEC possess unbridled authority with regard to the fines and penalties
they assess.119
A. THE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT OUTSIDE THE COURT SYSTEM

The DOJ has created an enforcement environment in which many of
its FCPA enforcement and liability theories do not undergo judicial scrutiny
on a regular basis.120 Beginning in 1997, the DOJ and SEC began adopting
“a more aggressive approach to investigating and prosecuting FCPA
violations.”121 The number of enforcement actions brought by both entities
combined more than doubled to five in 2004, more than doubled again in
2005 with twelve actions, and substantially more than doubled in 2007
when thirty-eight actions were brought compared to the fifteen actions

118
No companies have gone all the way through to a jury trial on any issues related to
an allegation of FCPA violations since the conclusion of these two cases. See infra Part
III.A for a discussion of how the government has continued to ramp up its enforcement
actions under the FCPA in spite of these two company victories years ago.
119
See Ashby Jones, FCPA: Company Costs Mount for Fighting Corruption, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044475250457802489398
8048764 (suggesting that few cases end up in court because most are settled which means
“there are few judicial decisions to guide corporate legal departments” which then in turn
discourages future litigation).

Even those [companies] that do have a good case are scared to fight and risk a criminal
indictment that would clobber their share price. It is commercially rational to roll over, all the
more so given how severely any failure to co-operate is punished. Ask Marubeni of Japan, whose
coyness towards the DOJ led to its being forced to plead guilty and pay an elevated fine. This
hands prosecutors a lot of discretion.

The Anti-Bribery Business, supra note 104 (“‘The FCPA often means what enforcement
agencies say it means,’ says [Mike] Koehler. ‘We have only a façade of enforcement.’”).
120
Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters A
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 126 (2011).
121
WARIN ET AL, supra note 37, at A-25.
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brought in 2006.122 This number continued to rise until 2010, when the
government brought a record seventy-four actions.123 This Comment
focuses more on the DOJ Fraud Section, which is able to bring both civil
and criminal enforcement actions while the SEC is limited to civil actions.
As these enforcement actions increased, the DOJ developed several
methods of resolution: declination, non-prosecution agreement (NPA),
deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), plea agreement, or trial before a
judge or jury.124
For some companies, admitting guilt through a plea bargain is the most
advised route by counsel under the circumstances. But if possible, a
company will make an effort to enter into a DPA or an NPA because they
allow a company to avoid admitting guilt. Under a DPA, the DOJ or SEC
will still “file a charging document with the court, while simultaneously
requesting that the prosecution be deferred for a period of time (typically
two or three years) during which the company may demonstrate its good
conduct.”125 Alternatively, NPAs are maintained by the parties outside of
the judicial system, though most are made available to the public on the
DOJ and SEC websites, which preserves the government’s right to file
charges later on if the company or individual fails to comply.126
Under this regime, the primary statutory interpretive function is
performed almost exclusively by the DOJ Fraud Section and the SEC. Over
time, the ratio of complaints filed in federal court to in-house administrative
proceedings has completely reversed. For example, in 2010, the SEC filed
twenty-five civil complaints in federal courts and only two in-house
administrative proceedings, while in 2012, the SEC filed eleven civil
complaints and one in-house administrative proceeding.127 But in 2014, the
SEC filed just one civil complaint in federal court and eight in-house

122

Id.
Id. See infra notes 131–134 for a discussion of this trend and corresponding trends in
average resolutions amounts.
124
WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-28 (citing RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 9 at 74–
75; U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL 9-28.300, 9-28.1000, 9-28.1300).
125
Id. at A-28 (explaining that a DPA will require a defendant to “(1) pay a monetary
penalty, (2) waive the statute of limitations, (3) cooperate with the government, (4) admit
relevant facts, and (5) commit to certain compliance and remediation terms”); see RESOURCE
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 74.
126
WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-28 (requiring similar concessions as outlined in
n.125 for DPAs).
127
2014 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 6–7 (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.gibson
dunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-FCPA-Update.aspx [hereinafter Gibson 2014
FCPA Update].
123
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administrative proceedings.128 The DOJ and SEC are removing more and
more investigations and subsequent cases from the purview of Article III
courts. There was also a meteoric rise in the DOJ and SEC combined
enforcement actions from twelve (7 DOJ / 5 SEC split) in 2005 to seventyfour (48 DOJ / 26 SEC split) in 2010.129 And while the statistics have
leveled off somewhat in the last three years with twenty-three (11 DOJ / 12
SEC split) in 2012, twenty-seven (19 DOJ / 8 SEC split) in 2013, and
twenty-six (17 DOJ/9 SEC split) in 2014, these numbers are still very high
when compared to the roughly thirty years of government FCPA
enforcement.130
This increase of enforcement actions outside of the formal judicial
process translates to enormous monetary penalties, and damages assessed
without a formal finding of guilt by a judge or jury. The DOJ and SEC
assessed a combined $1.8 billion in corporate fines, penalties and
disgorgement in 2010 compared to $300,000 in 2000 FCPA enforcement.131
Prior to 2005, the single largest corporate monetary resolution between the
government and a company occurred in 1995 when Lockheed Corporation
paid $24.8 million.132 But since the post-2005 enforcement boom, the
average corporate monetary resolution has only dipped below $25 million
four times.133 At the peak of the DOJ and SEC enforcement boom in 2010
(quantity of actions brought), the average resolution was $81,860,000.134 In
2015, the number of resolutions was one-third the number that occurred in
2010 (74 resolutions), and yet 2015 saw an average corporate resolution of
$156,610,000.135 This is partially attributable to use of disgorgement.136
128

Id.
Id. at 2.
130
Id.
131
Koehler, supra note 120, at 100–04.
132
Gibson 2014 FCPA Update, supra note 127, at 3; “Early FCPA penalties imposed on
corporations ranged from a few hundred thousand to a few million dollars.” WARIN ET AL.,
supra note 37, at A-25–26 (citing examples of judgments and plea agreements from the
1980s and early 1990s).
133
Gibson 2014 FCPA Update, supra note 127, at 3 (noting the average resolution
dipped below $25 million in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2012).
134
Id. at 2–3.
135
Id.
136
“Disgorgement is a civil remedy with roots in the traditional equitable remedies of
restitution and recoupment. Imposition of the disgorgement remedy requires corporations
subject to FCPA liability to forfeit the amount of ‘ill-gotten’ arising from the bribery at
issue. Use of the disgorgement remedy is a recent but growing practice on the part of the
SEC.” Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 325, 336 (2013).
129
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Disgorgement was not considered an available remedial action at the
government’s disposal from the passage of the FCPA.137 It was never
sought by the SEC in the first twenty-seven years of the FCPA’s
existence.138 Since 2004, the SEC has sought disgorgement in almost every
case and in 2010, “ninety-six percent of the proceeds from SEC FCPA
settlements consisted of disgorgement and prejudgment interest, a total
amounting to approximately $500 million.”139 Like many aspects of the
FCPA, the SEC’s authority to seek disgorgement has gone unchallenged in
federal courts.140 The government determines the possible maximum
penalty it can assess under the Sentencing Guidelines and Alternative
Minimum Fines Act, which is then used to increase fines above the FCPAmandated limits to twice the amount the offender stood to gain through his
or her illicit financial transaction.141 If a company wishing to avoid bet-thecompany litigation feels this is too high, either because they do not believe
their conduct violated the FCPA or because they believe their conduct was
not that egregious, the government often responds by pointing out that they
could indict a company for as many violations as alleged bribes were made
and seek the $2,000,000 statutory maximum fine for each such violation.
This number is often much larger than that calculated under the Sentencing
Guidelines, so companies agree to the increased fines. It is unclear if an
indictment structured this way would hold up in court.
While there is a trend away from criminal or civil litigation, arguably
by both the authorities and the companies involved, there is an increasing
number of guilty pleas at the same time. From 1990 to 2007, the vast
majority of FCPA cases “yielded settlements before the parties adjudicated
any criminal issues in court” and the government “disposed of 77% of the
investigations through non-prosecution agreements and pleas, while only 14

137

Id. at 337 (“While not explicitly disallowed by the FCPA, the ‘lack of any statement
that disgorgement should be part of the SEC’s enforcement arsenal, and the rarity of the
remedy at the time that Congress passed the FCPA and its amendments’ have led some to
question the propriety of the remedy. As with many aspects of the FCPA, the exact contours
of the SEC’s disgorgement authority have never been tested in court.’”).
138
Id. at 336.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 336–37 (discussing the SEC’s theory of statutory interpretation to justify
disgorgement as an FCPA remedy and the legal and practical problems arising from this
tenuous interpretation).
141
18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012). Of course, the government is only supposed to assess
this fine increase when supported by evidence and the offender pleads guilty or is proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(a) (2012) (“In General.—A defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine.”).
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investigations resulted in convictions, dismissals, or acquittals.”142 More
recently, the DOJ and SEC have moved away from settling cases through
DPAs or NPAs and instead seek plea agreements from corporate
defendants. For example, only two of DOJ’s seven corporate enforcement
actions in 2013 resulted in plea agreements, and in 2014, five of DOJ’s
seven corporate enforcement actions resulted in guilty pleas.143 “While the
distinction between plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and
non-prosecution agreements may be minor in substance and consequence,
the government’s decision to extract a guilty plea is generally understood to
be a harsher form of corporate punishment.”144
B. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INSUFFICIENT LITIGATION

Too little litigation on a statute like the FCPA can sometimes lead to
improper or undesirable interpretive results. Many terms and provisions of
the FCPA remain unapplied by district courts and juries, leading to a dearth
of appellate case law examining the ambiguities left by Congress. In the
case of the FCPA, the statutory interpretation is left to the DOJ and SEC
through rulemaking and administrative proceedings. One might initially
miss the issue of concern. The problem is not that the DOJ and SEC are
completely incapable of interpreting congressional directives from a statute
and filling in any remaining holes. Rather, the problem is that the DOJ and
SEC have skin in the game—the FCPA has become extremely lucrative for
these governmental bodies.145 And government attorneys who perpetuate
this enforcement regime go into private practice to represent companies and
build up very successful white-collar practices.146
142

Kovacich, supra note 29, at 546 n.112 (citing Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP 7 (2008), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/
Files/Old-Site-Files/LIT_FCPA_Trends_121208.pdf (indicating a desire on behalf of
companies and authorities alike for quick disposal methods that generate little public or
industry attention respectively) [hereinafter Shearman Recent Trends 2008]).
143
Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP 4
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2015/01/
Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-only-LT-010515.pdf [hereinafter Shearman Recent Trends
2015].
144
Id.
145
See supra Part III.A for discussion of the massive criminal penalties the DOJ and
SEC are assessing and collecting.
146
“‘This is good business for law firms,’ says Joseph Covington, who headed the
Justice Department’s FCPA efforts in the 1980s and is now codirector of white-collar
defense at Jenner & Block. ‘This is good business for accounting firms, it’s good business
for consulting firms, the media–and Justice Department lawyers who create the marketplace
and then get yourself a job.’” Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts
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1. The Government’s Enforcement Regime is not Interchangeable with Case
Law and Perpetuates the Lack of Case Law
The lack of judicial oversight has bred an environment marked by
over-enforcement and a lack of transparency. There are indications that the
DOJ’s activity would be reined in if challenged in court. For example,
while the penalties assessed against corporate defendants outside the court
system have sky-rocketed over the past five to ten years, the number of
individuals penalized in court has actually decreased.147 Of the forty-two
individual defendants sentenced to prison terms for violations of the FCPA
since 2010, only five of those defendants received sentences within the
Sentencing Guidelines range—most received shorter sentences.148
Individuals have incentives to contest the government’s allegations of
FCPA violations because of the loss of personal liberty they face. The
number of individuals receiving prison sentences lower than the
recommended guideline ranges suggests that either the government is
cutting deals with individuals for more information or the courts are
providing a bulwark against overzealous prosecution. The latter possibility
begs the question of what corporate criminal fines (and civil fines imposed
by the SEC) might look like if reviewed and imposed by courts rather than
the DOJ through DPAs, NPAs, and settlements.
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty issued a revised memorandum
(the “McNulty Memorandum”) of guidelines for companies in 2006 which
laid out factors the DOJ considers when deciding whether to prosecute and
how a company can cooperate to avoid higher levels of liability.149 These
discretionary factors are supposed to help determine whether a company
deserves cooperation credits and whether the DOJ should prosecute.150
Some factors include “the sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of
success at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other
consequences of conviction; and the adequacy of noncriminal

Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/
0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html.
147
WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-30; Shearman Recent Trends 2015, supra note
143, at 2 (depicting the number of individuals criminally penalized by the DOJ declining
from 44 individuals in 2009 to 12 individuals in 2014 (most of whom received prison
sentences)).
148
WARIN ET AL, supra note 37, at A-30.
149
Memorandum from Paul McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. to Head of
Dep’t Components & United States Att’ys. (Dec. 12, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
150
Id. at 4.
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approaches.”151 Other corporation-specific factors considered are “the
nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the
public, . . . the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s pre-existing
compliance program, . . . [and the] collateral consequences, including
disproportionate harm to shareholders . . . and [the] impact on the
public.”152
The problem with the McNulty Memorandum is that it fails to restrain
prosecutors in any meaningful way—prosecutors are only instructed to
“consider the sufficiency of the evidence and the likelihood of success at
trial.”153 The government does not need to seriously consider whether the
evidence would be sufficient to win at trial because both the government
and many companies push for settlement under the current enforcement
environment.154 The pressure to settle is especially felt by smaller
companies who cannot afford the expense and cost to their reputation that
public litigation brings and who rarely have the ability to invest in
developing a rigorous compliance program to help mitigate the DOJ’s
desire to prosecute.155 Because the government knows companies are
unlikely to pursue litigation in light of this “robust settlement history,” there
is even more of an incentive for the government to unfairly “consider the
weight of the evidence and whether it supports success at trial.”156 In
addition, the government’s use of these agreements (DPAs, NPAs, and
settlements) allows it to “receive facts from potential defendants in
exchange for a diversion agreement [and then] weave the facts into
convincing narratives.”157 The threat of this settlement regime is felt even
more by SMEs than large corporations with significantly greater resources
to devote to litigation and settlement.
This hostile enforcement environment for SMEs is only exacerbated
by the fact that the DOJ and SEC have essentially read many of the safety
valves and affirmative defenses out of the FCPA. For example, the
151

Id.
Id.
153
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 561.
154
See The Anti-Bribery Business, supra note 104 (discussing how even companies with
good cases chose not to litigate in court against the government because of the financial cost
and share price risks).
155
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 561–62.
156
Id.
157
Eldridge, supra note 58, at 750 (noting that this feature of the enforcement regime
allows the government to “overcome evidentiary difficulties [and] enforce the FCPA when it
may not have a strong chance of success under evidentiary burdens or the FCPA’s provisions
at trial”).
152
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statutory exception for facilitating payments exception allows for a
facilitating or expediting payment to be made for the purpose of securing
performance of a routine governmental action.158 The DOJ has read this
exception very narrowly, interpreting that it is difficult for companies to
claim the exception in an enforcement context.159 In 2008, Westinghouse
Air Brake Technologies Corporation self-reported FCPA violations to the
DOJ and SEC.160 Some of the alleged payments certainly constituted a
violation, but the NPA stated that Westinghouse made one payment of less
than $100 to the standards and certification agency in India to “ensure that
inspections would be scheduled and performed and to obtain certificates
usually issued upon delivery of conforming products.”161 This agency was
responsible for conducting inspections of finished products prior to
shipping and despite this looking like the kind of facilitating payment the
exemption was created to protect, the DOJ listed it as a violation in the
NPA.162 The DOJ and SEC have successfully eliminated the majority of
judicial oversight and are now capable of circumventing congressional
intent by selecting which provisions of the FCPA are to be interpreted
narrowly and which are to be interpreted broadly. These determinations
then govern companies interacting with the DOJ and SEC.163
158

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2012).
See generally Earle & Cava, supra note 5, at 139 (discussing the confusion
surrounding the facilitating payments exception under the FCPA based on government
enforcement trends and the DOJ’s ineffective opinion procedure releases):
159

Very obviously, the private sector is confused by the state of the law both in the United States
and abroad; predictably, it is reacting in a rather rational manner. The Deloitte Anticorruption
Practices Survey 2011 of 276 executives revealed that 47% of companies prohibited facilitating
payments in all cases, 36% allowed them with preapproval and only 5% allowed them with no
restrictions. Of the combined percentage of companies that permit some type of facilitating
payment, 4% allowed between $250-$499; 7% allowed up to $500; 13% percent allowed $100$249; 23% allowed under $100; and 53% had no restrictions.

Id. at 139–40 (italics omitted).
160
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation
Agrees to Pay $300,000 Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Violations in India (Feb. 14,
2008), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/re-westinghouse-air-brake-technologiescorporation-2008.
161
WARIN ET AL., supra note 37, at A-17–18.
162
Id. at A-18; see also Non Prosecution Agreement, In Re Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies Corporation, at Appendix A 3–4 (Feb. 8, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
criminal-fraud/case/re-westinghouse-air-brake-technologies-corporation-2008 (showing that
the DOJ merely asserted in its statement of facts the existence of the payments to insure the
foreign agency “would schedule and perform inspections” followed by the claim that such
payments were unlawful).
163
“Due to the lack of FCPA case law, corporations and individuals necessarily relied
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The nature of this extra-judicial enforcement regime means that the
government has created a lucrative revenue stream with little connection to
victims of overseas bribery by American companies and American citizens.
In fact, none of the money goes to actual victims of the bribery in any given
case through restitution.164 And the U.S. Treasury has a weak case that it is
actually harmed by the bribery. One could argue that bribery has the
potential to interfere with the aims of foreign aid grants, economic
competition, or particular policy goals of the political branches; however,
there are causation challenges when trying to link one act of bribery to one
of those potential harms.165 Increasingly, the highest fines imposed by the
DOJ are actually being assessed against international companies more so
than domestic ones, which was not the original purpose of the FCPA.166
The government is unlikely to voluntarily decrease or eliminate this
revenue stream given its profitability. In the DOJ Civil Division’s 2013
budget justification, the DOJ referred to itself as the “profit center of the
U.S. Treasury.”167 Recently, the DOJ’s former Assistant Chief for FCPA
enforcement admitted: “the government sees a profitable program, [and] it’s
going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”168
Settlements are the vehicle by which the DOJ generates a strong
revenue stream. The punishments against companies are incredibly heavy,
even in the case of settlements, with the typical range between $20-30
million and a high of $800 million.169 With these ranges and possible jail
on agency guidance documents and published settlement agreements to inform their conduct
and avoid liability. As a result, these materials became de facto agency jurisprudence.”
Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of A New Pack:
Should the FCPA Guidance Represent A New Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal
Liability Risks?, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014).
164
See generally Turk, supra note 136.
165
Id. at 338 (pointing out that even an argument that shareholders are “victimized” by
corporate bribes falls flat considering most bribes are used to procure business overseas and
increase corporate profits).
166
Id. at 342. See supra Part I.A regarding the original purpose of the FCPA.
167
Turk, supra note 136, at 353 & notes 154–155 (citing Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
FY 2013 Budget and Performance Plans 23 (2012), http:// www.justice.gov/jmd/2013
justification/pdf/fy13-civ-justification.pdf; Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2011
President’s Budget 20-22 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11crm-justification.pdf (“requesting more FCPA staff while noting that ‘the [Criminal]
Division’s FCPA prosecutions have resulted in fines and penalties totaling more than $1
billion’”)).
168
Id. at 362–63 (citing Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police, AM. LAW.
(May 17, 2011), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202457704533/Here-Come-thePayoff-Police (quoting William Jacobson, former Assistant Chief at the DOJ)).
169
Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the
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time for individual defendants, corporate defendants do not want to take the
risk of going to trial.170 “[T]he DOJ and SEC both actively punish
noncompliance; companies faced with possible DOJ investigation are
generally quick to settle because the agencies treat fighting the charges as
noncompliance.”171 And if large, multinational corporations are passing up
the opportunity to challenge the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations due to the
heavy penalties being threatened, SMEs stand little chance of surviving
when forced to choose between litigating and accepting a settlement. It
becomes a lose-lose situation.
Defenders of the current enforcement regime might point to the DOJ’s
FCPA opinion releases as a viable replacement for case law. While these
opinion releases are required by statute and are supposed to aid companies
in complying with the FCPA, they fall far short, in benefits and quality, of
case law.172 In fact, the statute states the DOJ “shall establish a procedure
to provide responses to specific inquiries by domestic concerns concerning
conformance of their conduct with the Department of Justice’s present
enforcement policy . . . [and] within 30 days after receiving such a request,
issue an opinion in response to that request.”173 The opinions are supposed
to inform the company whether or not the specified prospective conduct
would violate the FCPA.174 But recently, DOJ opinions responding to these
anonymous requests for guidance have become “scarce, slow in coming,
and highly general (since they do not name the countries to which they
refer).”175 Were these opinion releases frequent and applicable beyond the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (2014) (citing Mike Koehler,
The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 924–25 (2010)); see, e.g., Plea
Agreement at 17, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:11-CR-00651 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5,
2011) (fine of $28 million); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Shell
Nigeria Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CR-00767 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) (fine of $30
million); Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined
Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http:// www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08crm-1105.html.
170
Muma, supra note 169, at 1344 (citing Koehler, supra note 169, at 940).
171
Id. (citing Koehler, supra note 169, at 926–29).
172
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e)(1), -2(f)(1) (2012).
173
Id. § 78dd-2(f)(1).
174
Id.
175
Muma, supra note 169, at 1344–45, 1345 n.50 (“The DOJ has only released a total of
ten opinions in the last five years.” See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015)); see, e.g.,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review No. 12-01 (U.S. Dep’t of Just. Sept. 18, 2012)
(opinion proc. release), http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf
(issued a full seven months after the initial request and “based on the facts as represented by

6. LAUDONE

2016]

3/1/2017 5:55 PM

FCPA: UNBRIDLED ENFORCEMENT

389

individual set of circumstances, then perhaps a stronger case could be made
that they are fungible with case law. Opinion releases and settlements
(including plea agreements, DPAs, and NPAs) have helped build an
environment where precedent does not carry the guiding force typically
associated with case law, and companies lack clarity on a host of
interpretive questions as well.176 Case law is needed for uniformity in the
enforcement regime and to uphold the rule of law.
2. The Enforcement Regime’s Negative Impact on SMEs
The current DOJ and SEC enforcement regime, with its host of flaws,
has and can have a negative impact on SMEs. The average SME may be
unaware of the existence of the FCPA, let alone its current reach, because
of the lack of public visibility of the statute due to the high settlement rates.
In addition, many local law firms representing SMEs do not have robust
FCPA practices and experience detecting bribery risks or developing
compliance plans. Further, there is a lack of case law for local law firms to
rely on if a SME client sought to expand its knowledge on the subject.177
Kovacich discusses how corrupt business practices are often “very complex
schemes involving kickbacks, discounts, and other subtle methods of
securing foreign business contracts that straddle the line of acceptability and
corruption,” which make detecting such corrupt business practices
challenging and expensive.178 All of these factors make for treacherous
waters for an SME looking to enter the global marketplace.
As early as 2007, the DOJ and SEC began focusing on SMEs engaging
in global trade.179 International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
the Requestor,” thereby making it inapplicable to a wide variety of similar situations).
176
See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 169, at 984–90 (discussing the similar facts but
materially different outcomes between the December 2007 enforcement action against
Lucent Technologies, Inc. (“agree[d] to pay $2.5 million in total fines and penalties for
merely FCPA books and records and internal controls violations—that is, no anti-bribery
violations”) and the December 2009 enforcement action against UTStarcom, Inc. (“settled its
matter by agreeing to pay $3 million in total fines and penalties for FCPA anti-bribery,
books and records and internal control violations”) (emphasis in original)).
177
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 553–54; see also supra Part II.B.
178
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 530 (noting that in addition to sophisticated schemes that
involve charitable donations, payments to reduce tax, and custom duties and payments for
government reports and certifications, many potential bribery situations are complicated by
cultural differences in the foreign country).
179
Mike Koehler, FCPA Compliance – It’s Not Just For Big Companies, FCPA
PROFESSOR (May 7, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-compliance-its-not-just-for-bigcompanies/ (providing a list of SMEs the government has brought enforcement actions
against since 2007).
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defines an SME as a company that falls within one of two tiers: companies
within the 100 to 1,000 employee range, and companies that range from
1,000 to 5,000 employees.180 The U.S. Small Business Association defines
a small business as having 500 employees or less for most manufacturing
and mining industries and $7.5 million in average annual receipts for
nonmanufacturing industries, with some industry-based exceptions.181 The
FCPA does not explicitly adopt any definition of an SME, nor does it
explicitly indicate that the statute applies differently to companies of
differing size and characteristics (i.e., private versus publicly traded).182
And the U.S. government does not have a universally accepted definition of
SMEs that is used across agencies and departments.183
In theory, the DOJ and SEC have had the authority to investigate and
prosecute SMEs engaged in overseas bribery of foreign officials since the
passage of the FCPA in 1977 because the FCPA does not expressly limit its
application to the large corporations who were committing the bribery that
spurred its passage.184 In 1988, the FCPA amendments created the
procedure for issuing general guidelines and advisory opinions for the
purpose of providing enforcement policy guidance to potential “exporters
and small businesses that are unable to obtain specialized counsel.”185 But
as discussed earlier,186 the use of these advisory opinions and the guidelines
themselves only provide advice on a modicum of the myriad situations that
can arise in global commerce where bribery might occur.
Complying with the statute, and more specifically the DOJ and SEC
standards, is often cost prohibitive for SMEs.187 It can be incredibly
180

Kovacich, supra note 29, at 531 n.13.
Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, (current as
of July 14, 2014) https://www.sba.gov/content/summary-size-standards-industry-sector (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
182
See, e.g., Kovacich, supra note 29, at 530.
183
See Small- and medium-Sized Enterprises: Overview of Participation in U.S.
Exports, supra note 2.
184
See supra Part I.A at notes 14–17.
185
H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 923 (1988); see also Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practice
Act on U.S. Business: Comptroller’s General Report to the Congress of the United States,
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 116 (1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf (last
visited Sept. 17, 2016).
186
See supra Part III.B.1 at notes 37–39, 172–176.
187
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 544 n.101; see, e.g., Koehler, supra note 120, at 106
(citing the example of Team Inc. described below).
Consider for example, when in October 2010, Team Inc. ($12.3 million net income in
2010) disclosed $3.2 million in professional costs associated with an FCPA investigation
focused on payments over a five-year period totaling less than $50,000 in a branch office to
181
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challenging to determine if a foreign entity is controlled in any way by the
government of that country and finding out such information without
offending global business partners can be impossible.188 And in situations
where bribery does occur, it is often perpetrated solely by the foreign
government unbeknownst to the company—for example, through the use of
local agents—making the unsophisticated company arguably a victim as
well.189 When a company is investigated and prosecuted by the DOJ, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are used to enact punishment on companies
based on aggravating and mitigating factors.190 The Sentencing Guidelines
take into account the size of a company, and as a result, SMEs will receive
a lower culpability score which helps lessen the punishment.191 But “there
are only two mitigating factors: (1) the existence of an effective compliance
and ethics program and (2) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of
responsibility,” and as discussed next, SMEs often do not have compliance
programs and may be unaware when they are involved in an act of
bribery.192 Any benefit received based on size will often be offset in the
context of an SME because “if high-level officials in the company were
involved in the misconduct, the company cannot receive the benefit of [a]
mitigation factor.”193 In small companies, the odds increase that senior
officials will be involved in international deals and activity and are thus
party to the alleged bribe, whether knowingly or not.194 Many SMEs are
unable to invest in sophisticated compliance plans like the ones created by
international law firms for large companies.195 However, it is difficult for
smaller companies to pass up on international opportunities to grow their

employees of foreign government owned enterprises in Trinidad. These improper payments
represent one-half of one percent of the Team Inc.’s overall revenue. TEAM INC.,
QUARTERLY REPORT (Form 10-Q), at 34 (Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/318833/000119312510226805/d10q.htm#tx100438_8; TEAM INC., REPORT FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED MAY 31, 2010 (Form 10-K), at 34 (Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/318833/000119312510181451/d10k.htm.
188
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 566.
189
See supra Part II.B, notes 94–99.
190
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)–(g) (2010) (instructing
companies to “apply subsections (b) through (g) [(aggravating and mitigating factors)]” to
determine final culpability score).
191
Bhojwani, supra note 87, at 73–74.
192
Id. at 73 (referencing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)–(g)); see
also supra Part II.B at notes 62–68.
193
Bhojwani, supra note 87, at 73 (referencing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 8C2.5(f)).
194
Id. at 73–74.
195
Muma, supra note 169, at 1347–48.
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business just because there may be risks.
3. Examples of the DOJ’s Over-Enforcement Against SMEs
In his order granting Lindsey Manufacturing Company’s motion to
dismiss on charges of prosecutorial misconduct, Judge A. Howard Matz
wrote “the very survival of that small, once highly-respected enterprise has
been placed in jeopardy.”196 The cost to Lindsey of both the investigation
and subsequent trial was crushing, but this is no isolated incident. Kovacich
writes about how the DOJ and SEC have honed in on certain industries, like
medical device manufacturing and agriculture, which are critical to the
Minnesota and Wisconsin economies.197 He sees this phenomenon
impacting the “business and legal landscape for small- and medium-sized
businesses across the country,” not just in those two states.198 For example,
Twin Cities-based AGA Medical, a company with only 300 employees, was
accused of making improper payments to doctors at state-owned hospitals
in China for purchasing AGA products.199 AGA Medical agreed to pay $2
million in criminal penalties based on the DOJ’s unchallenged theory that
when a business is state-owned, its employees are foreign officials because
they are “instrumentalities” of the foreign nation.200
Consider the SEC’s civil case against Immucor, Inc. (500 employees)
and its CEO for allegedly paying €13,500 to a director of an Italian hospital
that turned out to be publicly owned.201 These payments were made to the
hospital for favoring Immucor on medical supply contracts and the CEO
ultimately paid a $30,000 penalty without having to admit or deny the
accusations in the complaint.202 In some circumstances, this is certainly a
net positive for the company. In practice, the outside world may perceive
that the company or individual did in fact do wrong and are just not being
196

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Aguilar Noriega, 831 F. Supp.
2d 1180, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see supra notes 111–117.
197
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 532.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 540, n.73 (citing Press Release, AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay $2
Million Penalty and Enter Deferred Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations, Dep’t of
Just. (June 3, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 546 n.111.
202
Id.; Litigation Release No. 20316, SEC Files Action Naming Officer of Immucor,
Inc., for Violating, and Aiding and Abetting Violations of, Books and Records and Internal
Control Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, (Sept. 28, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20316.
htm.
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forced to admit it, even if that is not the case. In addition, the company or
individual is then forbidden from ever publicly denying wrongdoing or
defending against accusations that wrongdoing occurred.
Finally, consider the story of a Mississippi-based producer and
marketer of cottonseed, Delta & Pine Land Company. Over a five-year
period, Delta & Pine made payments amounting to $43,000 to Turkish
officials in exchange for “reports and certifications necessary to maintain its
business operations in Turkey.”203 While the purpose of these payments
was merely to speed up the government’s inspection and reporting process,
because the SEC and DOJ have read the facilitating payments exception so
narrowly (some argue it has been almost completely eliminated from the
statute), Delta & Pine faced an uphill battle.204 The SEC alleged that
several of the payments did not coincide with inspections or reports and
Delta & Pine ultimately agreed to pay a $300,000 penalty.205 These are just
some examples of the negative and unfair impact the DOJ’s and SEC’s
enforcement regime has on SMEs operating in the global marketplace.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. EXISTING PROPOSALS

Several proposals exist for amending the FCPA to account for the
problems associated with the statute’s implementation, some of which have
been discussed in the preceding pages of this article. In thinking about how
to address these issues, it seems logical to start with existing proposals and
discuss why they will likely fall short of the goal of reforming the
enforcement regime in a way that removes the proverbial government boot
off of the back of the many SMEs that desire to expand into the global
marketplace.
Some advocate that the most basic approach to fixing the FCPA is to
decriminalize unwilling bribery.206 Bruce Klaw argues that the DOJ’s and
SEC’s prosecution over the last decade has included many individuals

203

Kovacich, supra note 29, at 542.
Id.
205
Id. (citing Press Release, Delta & Pine and Turk Deltapine Agree to Pay a $300,000
Penalty to Settle FCPA Charges, SEC (July 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2007/lr20214.htm (explaining that Delta & Pine agreed to pay a $300,000
penalty); In the Matter of Delta & Pine Land Co., Exchange Act Release No. 56, 138, 91
SEC Docket 371 (July 26, 2007), http:// www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf).
206
Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in
International Business Transactions, 49 Harv. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 305 (2012).
204
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whose payments were made unwillingly.207 Klaw emphasizes that in
accordance with United States’ extortion law, an individual who makes an
“unwilling” payment—a payment that “while made intentionally and
knowingly, [is] not made voluntarily or corruptly because the payer is
subject to express or implicit coercive extortion, placing them in reasonable
fear that if they do not pay, they will be treated unfairly”—should not be
penalized.208 Numerous federal courts have recognized that an individual or
a domestic concern can act out of fear because of extortion, including “fear
of economic loss.”209
Among his many suggestions, Klaw outlines two possible solutions
relevant to the treatment of SMEs under the FCPA. First, Klaw makes the
case for the decriminalization of unwilling bribery regardless of whether or
not the extortion “involved threats of threatened jail, property destruction,
injury, or death” because there is a lack of the requisite mental state.210
Klaw also argues for the decriminalization of willing bribery under the
theory that it will promote transparency, that companies should only be
punished for failing to disclose, and that other companies and foreign
nations could still sue the discloser under the host country’s laws.211
Second, Klaw argues that victims of extortion should be permitted to
disclose the “bribe” and be able to recover non-speculative losses resulting
from the extortion.212
Klaw’s first solution should be rejected because companies should be
held to a high standard when faced with non-violent, non-destructive
consequences to bribery refusal. The line drawing between threats of
extortion that include violence and those that do not is reasonable, and the
use of economic coercive behavior by a foreign official does not justify
allowing companies to contravene America’s foreign policy interests.213

207

Id. at 320.
Id. at 320–21.
209
Id. at 321 (citing United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1976))).
210
Id. at 344–47 (noting that in other non-FCPA contexts, federal courts have found that
“extortion is committed when a public official makes wrongful use of his office to obtain
money not due him or his office”).
211
Id. at 347–49.
212
Id. at 368–70.
213
To clarify, I am drawing a distinction between unwilling bribery due to some form of
extortion (violent or non-violent) that a company is aware of and unwilling bribery in the
form of clever gamesmanship by foreign officials (i.e., the use of consultants) where the
company is unaware that the foreign official is seeking a bribe at all. Klaw’s article does not
address the latter version of unwilling bribery.
208
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And willing bribery, where no extortion is involved, should certainly
remain illegal under the FCPA. At the time the FCPA was enacted, the
series of political and business scandals had undermined public confidence
in the integrity of the market, jeopardized American foreign policy of
promoting democracy and capitalism, and posed a danger to the free market
system, where companies should be able to honestly and ethically compete
in areas like price and quality of product.214 Decriminalizing both willing
and unwilling bribery in cases of non-violent extortion essentially repeals
the core of the FCPA, which is an overreaction to the problems facing
SMEs. Decriminalizing unwilling bribery based on a company’s lack of
knowledge, on the other hand, would protect companies, especially
unsophisticated SMEs, from being victimized on the global stage through
extortion and then victimized again by the DOJ and SEC in the form of
hefty penalties and public embarrassment. This would not solve other
issues that plague the statute, like vague and overly-expanded terms
(“foreign official” and “instrumentality”)215 and erosion of the facilitating
payments exception.216 In addition, it would not protect SMEs and their
executives who unknowingly engage in bribery but were not coerced.
However, decriminalizing unwilling bribery would constitute a positive
reform to the mental state requirements, either by clarifying their reach or
serving as an affirmative defense.
Another existing proposal is for Congress to amend the FCPA to
require the State Department to better define terms used in the enforcement
of the statute. Specifically, Matthew Muma argues that if the State
Department drew on the expertise of Foreign Service officers and defined
“foreign official” and “instrumentality” for each country, companies would
be better equipped to navigate situations in specific countries by relying on
detailed documentation of how the business and political culture in the host
country operates.217
This would render FCPA enforcement more
predictable than it is under the underutilized and insufficient opinion release
214

Id. at 307.
See, e.g., Muma, supra note 169, at 1342 (identifying the problems associated with
vague terms in the FCPA including “foreign official” and “instrumentality” and proposing
solutions to remedy this issue). See generally Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 143 (2016) (discussing recent
problematic developments in the interpretation of the term “foreign official” under the
FCPA).
216
See the discussions regarding, and examples of, the erosion of the facilitating
payments exceptions at supra note 60, 158–162, 204–205.
217
Muma, supra note 169, at 1353–54 (creating a rebuttable presumption of FCPA
compliance that could be challenged in court).
215
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regime currently in existence, and the FCPA’s application tailored in
“specific countries to U.S. foreign policy goals.”218
This proposal would make a positive difference in the education and
subsequent operation of companies of all sizes overseas and would take into
account societies where gift-giving in business transactions is acceptable
and not considered bribery.219 For example, in the case of AGA Medical,
the company would have benefited from a State Department analysis and
report that identified doctors of government-owned hospitals as foreign
officials under the statute.220 Whether it is the State Department, the courts,
or Congress, a disinterested party other than the DOJ and SEC should be
taking greater care to define these critical terms.221
Unfortunately, this solution does not sufficiently address concerns
regarding the culpability standard under the law as a whole. This solution
alone would not protect the CEO of an SME who inadvertently pays for a
“government consultant” or “government agent” on an environmental or
agricultural project, not realizing that the consultant is a clandestine conduit
for the government to extort bribes. The DOJ’s and SEC’s 2012 FCPA
Resource Guide likewise fails to take into account the lack of sophistication
of SMEs in international business deals and transactions, but rather, only
considers the lack of sophistication of SMEs with regard to compliance
programs.222 But because SMEs often lack compliance plans and FCPAexperienced legal counsel, these sophistication considerations do not benefit
them.
Others argue for the creation of a compliance defense because the lack
of an adequate defense of this nature “reduces a company’s incentive to
218

Id.
Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Unique Problems with FCPA Compliance in the
People’s Republic of China, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 15, 17 (May/June 2007) (“It is well known
by companies doing business in the [People’s Republic of China (PRC)] that PRC
businessmen value the opportunity to gain exposure to similar businesses outside of the
PRC.” And while “PRC rules and regulations require any gift that might affect an official’s
impartial exercise of his public function be turned over to the state . . . anticorruption laws
and regulations are reportedly ignored and compliance met with ‘incredulity’ by PRC
businessmen.”).
220
See supra notes 198–199.
221
The DOJ and SEC do not qualify as “disinterested” because while they are
technically just the neutral enforcers of the FCPA, comments by department officials and the
revenue from penalties statistics indicate the DOJ and SEC cannot be expected to hamstring
themselves.
222
Lanny A. Breuer, et al. (panelists), The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy
Studies 2012 National Lawyers Convention the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 433, 458 (2014) (discussing RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 9).
219
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invest in internal anti-bribery policies and to monitor and report any
identified violations.”223 Under this new defense, a company would still
need to make a showing of reasonableness with regard to its
implementation and maintenance of an anti-bribery program and “[m]eeting
these conditions would only afford a rebuttable presumption that the
company as an entity is not liable for the FCPA violations of its rogue
employees.”224
Of course, when considering SMEs, the alleged rogue employee could
easily be a high-ranking executive because they are more closely held
companies. Additionally, this solution is not adequate for SMEs because
they often cannot afford to develop a robust compliance program of the sort
that would be required to take advantage of this rebuttable compliance
defense. Thus, even if a compliance program defense existed, it would be
insufficient to protect SMEs from unbridled enforcement.225
Some have suggested that amending the statute to compensate victims
of corruption and bribery would alter how the DOJ and SEC prosecute
companies under the FCPA.226 Currently, the DOJ uses the FCPA
enforcement regime as a profit generator and makes little to no attempt to
compensate victims of American corruption and bribery abroad, despite

223

Irina Sivachenko, Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA’s
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages
Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 425 (2013).
224
Id.
225
The Conference Report for the 1988 FCPA Amendments indicates that a provision
granting safe harbor to corporations with FCPA compliance program from prosecution was
included but ultimately removed from the final bill. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 922–23
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1955; see also Bhojwani, supra note 87, at 74 n.57
(referencing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Assessment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 38
(2011) (statement of George Terwilliger, Partner, White & Case, LLP) (advocating for
adoption of FCPA safe-harbor provision that “shield[s] from criminal liability companies
that operate demonstrably robust compliance programs and that self-report any misconduct
that arises”)).
226
See, e.g., Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419 (2012)
(advocating for a private right of action under the FCPA for a variety of reasons including
compensating victims of FCPA violations); see also Shane Frick, “ICE” Capades:
Restitution Orders and the FCPA, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 433, 448–50 (2013)
(discussing how DOJ would have to begin thinking of FCPA violations in terms of harm
done to victims (economic, cultural, etc.) which would (A) potentially limit the amount of
penalties/damages the government could seek from companies and (B) prosecutorial action
taken against companies would be based on a need to make specific victims whole and not
on the current reality that all penalties/damages go back to the U.S. government).
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repeatedly claiming that bribery is not a victimless crime.227 Victims have
sought relief in U.S. courts for restitution in the wake of FCPA violations.
For example, the Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica
(ICE) “petitioned for victim status of Alcatel-Lucent’s wide-ranging bribery
scheme” in 2011 due to alleged massive losses and catastrophic harm
resulting from the bribery.228 ICE claimed the harm done was to other
employees and the company based on the actions of five employees out of
16,500 total employees.229 The DOJ argued against giving ICE victim
status and restitution because ICE employees were also involved in the
bribery.230
While ICE’s petition ultimately failed,231 there is room for more
sympathetic bribery victims to apply pressure to the DOJ enforcement
regime by seeking restitution. If a future case brought by an entity like ICE
or an individual is successful, this could open the door to amending the
FCPA to specifically require the government to seek to disperse a portion of
the fines and disgorgement levied against offending U.S. companies to
victims of corruption abroad, which would hopefully cause the DOJ to
more carefully consider when to prosecute, thereby benefiting SMEs and
companies in general.
Matthew Kovacich argues specifically for Congress to “update the
FCPA to provide a more usable opinion procedure and legality defense.”232
Kovacich argues that while Congress intended to protect a company if it
227

See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., California Company, Its Two Executives
and Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their
Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico (May
10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html (“Bribery is not a
victimless crime . . . .”); see Alexandra Wrage, Paying the Fox to Buy New Chickens,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandra-wrage/payingthe-fox-to-buy-new_b_647837.html. Contra Andy Spalding, “A DOJ Initiative that Helps
Corruption’s Victims” FCPA BLOG (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/10/
15/a-doj-initiative-that-helps-corruptions-victims.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea Agrees to Relinquish More Than $30
Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/second-vice-president-equatorial-guinea-agrees-relinquish-more-30-millionassets-purchased (providing money for the direct benefit of people harmed by the Equatorial
Guinea Vice President’s abuse of office through large-scale foreign official corruption).
228
Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 1, 51 (2012) (citing United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20907-MGC
(S.D. Fla. dismissed May 31, 2011)).
229
Id. at 51–52.
230
Id. at 52.
231
Id.
232
Kovacich, supra note 29, at 563.
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abides by the local law or custom in a foreign nation, this protection is weak
because the statute requires the local law or custom to be expressly written
down in the foreign nation’s law.233 Congress failed to realize that not all
social norms are encapsulated in law, even if they have substantial force.234
Kovacich calls for Congress to amend the statute to provide for an opinion
release procedure where companies could address matters of custom and
business norms with the DOJ and SEC in advance of taking action,
especially when the custom or norm is not written in the foreign country’s
laws.235 This solution would certainly make a significant difference for
many companies of all sizes. But, once again, the unsophisticated SMEs
are not protected from many unwilling “bribes” under this solution, and it is
not geared towards solving the larger problem of the DOJ and SEC
enforcement regime unchecked by case law.
B. NEW SOLUTIONS

This section builds off of some of the existing solutions proposed to
solve the FCPA’s many problems while also offering several additional
alternative solutions that would benefit SMEs in particular and protect them
from the current, unfair enforcement regime. Specifically, this section
argues for legislative clarification regarding the mental state requirements
for domestic concerns and for statutory provisions requiring more judicial
oversight of the DOJ and SEC prosecution regime under the FCPA with
regard to DPAs, NPAs, and settlements.
In a perfect world, change would happen organically by companies
that are able to afford the risk of challenging the DOJ and SEC in court. In
particular, companies should further litigate the FCPA’s mental states to
better define these terms, the narrowing of statutory exceptions, and the
overall spirit of the statute regarding how damages are assessed.236
Unfortunately, expecting companies to take the extremely high-risk path of
a jury trial is not very realistic, especially in light of the enforcement regime
the DOJ and SEC have developed over time, which forces companies to
settle in the face of such extreme penalties. Although the government’s
record is zero for two in federal court against corporations,237 most
companies remain unconvinced that the monetary risks are worth the
litigation fight that would await them in court.
233
234
235
236
237

Id. at 562–63.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.
See the text accompanying supra notes 106–119.
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The most important and necessary legislative change required is for
Congress to amend the statute to alter the mental state requirement to
account for businesses early on in their international economic participation
and development. This can be accomplished in several ways. Perhaps the
simplest way is to create a specific intent element applicable for the antibribery provision to make the FCPA akin to the tax statutes. In Ratzlaf v.
United States,238 the Supreme Court reviewed the defendant’s conviction
for illegally structuring a transaction, by “break[ing] up a single transaction
above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions[] for
the purpose of evading a financial institution’s reporting requirement.”239
The Court held that the statute’s “willfulness” element required something
more than just a “purpose to circumvent a bank’s reporting obligation” and
that ignorance of the anti-structuring law was indeed an excuse.240 The
Court held that provisions of the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act (Bank Secrecy Act)241 and other tax statutes are so difficult
to understand that to say a lack of knowledge of the statute and its
provisions was no excuse would be to read the willful element out of the
statute or at least render it superfluous.242 If a lack of knowledge of the tax
statute was not a defense, there was a risk of innocent conduct being
punished.243
Since there is little chance a case under the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions will reach the Supreme Court in the near future due to the
settlement trends, Congress should act to amend the statute to more clearly
function like the tax statutes. This would allow SMEs some measure of
protection because, in the event they cannot afford an expensive compliance
program or are completely ignorant of the FCPA due to a lack of
sophistication and previous international business experience, they have a
viable defense under the intent element. Then, the government would have
to show that the company was aware of the FCPA and its prohibitions and
that the company willfully violated the statute. It should be noted that in
order to succeed in this endeavor, the “willfully” element must be made to
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510 U.S. 135 (1994).
Id. at 136 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988)).
240
Id. at 136–37, 149.
241
Pub. L. No. 91–508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5325).
242
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136.
243
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1476 (pointing out that cases like Ratzlaf presented “the
risk of catching individuals who engaged in innocent conduct” and that courts have said such
a risk does not exist in the FCPA context).
239
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apply to SMEs under the domestic concern section244 because currently it
only applies to individuals.245 This would be especially helpful for small,
closely held businesses where the lines between the corporation’s actions
and individuals’ actions can be blurred because high-level executives make
a wide range of decisions as to a company’s beginning forays into the
global marketplace.
Alternatively, Congress should put in place new boundaries on the use
of settlements by the DOJ and SEC when prosecuting companies. The DOJ
and SEC should be required by statute to abide by the following new
settlement boundary steps: (1) all investigations lasting more than 365 days
must be filed in an Article III court as preliminary indictments; (2) these
preliminary indictments will be reviewed every 90 days for merit, and the
Article III court will have the authority to dismiss the indictments and by
extension, the investigations when they are not yielding fruit or for a failure
to prosecute; and (3) settlements that exceed the statutorily prescribed fine
amounts or cross certain statutorily provided benchmarks must be approved
by the Article III court or meet certain thresholds for reasonableness. These
measures will provide substantial protections to companies of all sizes, but
particularly SMEs that struggle to pay for the investigation, litigation, and
any settlement that comes with a DOJ or SEC decision to prosecute.
The first element is designed to force the DOJ and SEC into the court
system where more judicial oversight will occur, even over settlements.
This will also prevent government agents from dragging out investigations
that force companies into DPAs and NPAs where the government then has
substantial control to place extreme remedy demands on the company in
exchange for the company avoiding trial and a public relations nightmare.246
The second element is designed to reinforce the need for the DOJ and SEC
to only pursue investigations and prosecutions for as long as they are
grounded in fact and reasonably likely to be successful. In addition, the
second element requires that a neutral party be present and able to step in
and save a company (particularly an SME) from being bled of resources in
its defense against unmeritorious prosecutions outside the scope of the
FCPA. The final element provides for a neutral arbiter to assess the
reasonableness of the penalty in light of the actions the defendant is
244

15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A) (West 1998) (for domestic concerns).
Lipper, supra note 40, at 1474–75 (discussing how at least one court’s imprecision in
attributing the willfulness element leads to an improper inference that the willfulness
element applies to both individual and domestic concerns under the FCPA when it does not).
246
See supra Part III.A and III.B.1 for a discussion of DPAs and NPAs and the
governments use of them.
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pleading guilty to or admitting occurred. The statute could be amended to
take into account and sanction the disgorgement policies of the DOJ and
SEC and then require any settlement over $6 million or (treble the
statutorily proscribed penalty for a violation) a certain percentage of the
company’s value (market capitalization) be approved by an Article III
judge.247 These elements will directly remedy situations like the one Team
Inc. faced where the investigation costs and potential fines far outweighed
the alleged prohibited conduct.248 Of course, a company that determined
this filing timeline was not in its best interest could stipulate with the
government to an extension of these deadlines (but not waive them
entirely).
One possible criticism of the settlement boundary steps solution is that
courts will apply Chevron deference to decades of department and agency
“jurisprudence,” thereby neutralizing the desired benefits of these
changes.249 Specifically, courts first look to “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue” and if the answer is yes, Congress’s
intent controls.250 But where the statute is silent or ambiguous on a
particular issue, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”251 One could argue
that these settlement boundary provisions will not be enough to encourage
courts to discuss the specific provisions and terms of the statute. Enforcing
step number two, for example, requires courts to evaluate the merit of the
preliminary indictment and related investigation. But if the courts punt in
favor of DOJ enforcement precedent regarding how various statutory
provisions, exceptions, and affirmative defenses work and what various
terms mean, then the merits review may not have the teeth needed to pare
back the DOJ and SEC enforcement regime. This is why Congress must
simultaneously enact amendments to the mental state requirement,
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There are other means of controlling the prosecution regime of the DOJ and SEC and
preventing SMEs from accruing crippling legal costs on top of excessive fines,
disgorgement, and settlement amounts. For example, Congress could provide that SME
attorney’s fees count toward the percentage threshold that requires judicial review of the
settlement.
248
See supra note 187.
249
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . .”).
250
Id. at 842–43 (holding that “the agency[] must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress”).
251
Id. at 843.
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incorporate the suggested changes in Part IV.A regarding the definitions of
“foreign officials” and “instrumentalities,” and provide some clarity on the
exceptions that exist in the statute for facilitating payments and abiding by
local law or custom.252 In conjunction with the settlement boundary steps,
these changes will make a meaningful difference for SMEs just entering, or
relatively new to, the global marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to put a stop to
massive international bribery by large, sophisticated U.S. corporations, but
not to penalize unsophisticated small- and medium--size enterprises new to
the international marketplace. In an era of unbridled, unsupervised DOJ
and SEC prosecution, the FCPA is not being enforced as originally
intended. Statutory exceptions have been effectively eliminated, the lack of
case law has muddied the waters with regard to mental state requirements,
and in an ironic twist, the very governmental bodies charged with rooting
out corruption abroad are now engaged in a sort of legal extortion through a
regime that over-enforces and over-penalizes companies regardless of their
actual culpability and ability to afford the necessary programs and controls
needed to stay abreast of and in compliance with the FCPA. The DOJ and
SEC cannot be trusted to make the necessary fixes on their own because
they have too much skin in the game—FCPA enforcement actions are
viewed as a cash cow and the authorities have given every indication that
the current prosecution and enforcement regime will only continue if not
expand.
Some of the existing solutions proposed by academics and
practitioners alike would certainly make a positive impact on the current
situation. But most, if not all, fall short of addressing problems unique to
SMEs under the FCPA. Muma makes a compelling case for the creation of
country-specific guides by the State Department to address concerns over
the definition of terms in the FCPA and also to distinguish differences in
culture and local custom for the purposes of applying and giving teeth to the
facilitating payments and local law or custom exceptions. But most of the
existing solutions are not tailored to assisting SMEs that are new to or
inexperienced in the global marketplace, cannot afford the expensive, big
law compliance plans large companies pay for, and are too often wholly
unaware of the FCPA and the forms corruption takes abroad.
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15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2012) (defining
“foreign official”).
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As a result, Congress needs to amend the FCPA in several ways. First,
Congress should add language to render the FCPA a specific intent statute
for the purposes of corporations rather than a general intent statute. And
Congress should require a showing of “willfulness” for domestic concerns
as well as individuals so that closely held companies that are tricked into
committing bribery have a defense. Second, Congress should put in place
new boundaries on the use of settlements by the DOJ and SEC when
prosecuting companies. The three additional requirements proposed in Part
IV.B will reign in meritless and unjust investigations and subsequent
prosecutions while also putting in place protection for SMEs that cannot
afford the high costs associated with said investigations and defending
against litigation and penalties. Finally, these additional steps will create
more judicial oversight of the current FCPA enforcement regime. The
purpose of this oversight, in addition to the reasons previously mentioned
above, is to create more opportunities for genuine statutory interpretation by
a disinterested third party to occur on FCPA terms and provisions of serious
importance. These include but are not limited to terms like “foreign
official” and “instrumentality,” as well as the various exceptions and
affirmative defenses that have been essentially eliminated through a severe
narrowing by the DOJ and SEC.
These changes, combined with some of the strong existing proposals,
could make for a better FCPA statute. With these changes, the FCPA will
better prevent foreign corruption by domestic companies and individuals for
the protection of the nation’s foreign policy goals and the promotion of a
fair capitalist system while also ensuring companies lacking culpability are
not swept in the broad net currently cast by the DOJ and the SEC.

